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Before World War II, the largest concentration of overseas 
Japanese migrants in Southeast Asia was in the Davao region in 
the Philippines. Similarly, the most significant Japanese eco-
nomic ventures anywhere in Southeast Asia were also concen-
trated in the area around Davao. Remarkably, both develop-
ments had occurred in a relatively brief period of time, i.e., in 
less than four decades. Both the scope of the Japanese settle-
ment at Davao and the speed with which it had grown were a 
tribute to the ingenuity and perseverance of the Japanese settlers 
as well as to the entrepreneurial leadership of a small nucleus of 
canny and determined Japanese adventurer-businessmen. 
While the Davao colony itself has been described in a num-
ber of sources, what this study seeks to do is to place the Davao 
story in the overall context of Japanese-Philippine relations. By 
principal reliance on the archives of the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, on the records of the American Bureau of In-
sular Affairs, and on the personal papers of Manuel L. Quezon, 
it is hoped that a more complete picture can be drawn of the 
many conflicting interests concerned with the Davao settlement. 
For here at Davao was a microcosm not only of Japanese-Ameri-
can relations but, also, perhaps more importantly, of the rela-
tions between an increasingly aggressive imperial Japan and a 
soon-to-be independent Philippines. 
It is, in fact, to this latter issue that the pages which follow are 
primarily devoted, and it is for this reason that the title refers to 
a "case study*' in Japanese-Philippine relations. For in one or 
another respect, all of the factors—economic, political, military— 
which affected the contacts between Japan and the Philippines 
during the American colonial period were highlighted in the 
Davao situation. Moreover, of special importance to the presen-
tation that follows is an understanding of this writer's hypothesis 
that during the period of American hegemony in the Islands, re-
lations between Japan and the Philippines were basically good 
and were in fact getting better even as World War II began. The 
contention is that what from time to time proved detrimental 
to Japanese-Philippine relations and what, of course, eventually 
brought them to a nadir were the tensions and strains in 
Japanese-American relations. 
In recent days many have been critical of the diplomats of 
the new nations of Asia, Africa, or the Middle East. Many 
scholars of Japanese politics have been equally critical of the 
record of Japan's diplomacy in the years before World War II. 
However, these critics might do well to reexamine their con-
clusions and recognize that at least in the instance of Japanese-
Philippine relations, Japan's diplomatic efforts were prudent, 
cautious, and generally successful, while, for their part, Filipino 
officials, despite their lack of any real authority since the Philip-
pines were still under American control, handled affairs with 
Japan with marked restraint and considerable acumen. 
Indeed, the record on both sides is particularly impressive 
when one considers the inflamed atmosphere that generally en-
veloped international affairs, especially after 1931. For there is 
no question that the focus of Japanese interest in Davao bore 
within it the seeds of potentially serious conflict between Japan 
and the Philippines. Yet, the restraint exercised by both Jap-
anese consular officials in the Islands and by members of the 
Filipino ruling elite maintained a relative equilibrium between 
the two states. T o be sure, there were recurrent irritants which 
temporarily ruffled the course of Japanese-Philippine relations, 
and many of these are recounted in this monograph. Neverthe-
less, the consistently overriding consideration for both parties 
was the recognition of the mutuality of economic benefits de-
rived from the Japanese development of Davao. 
However, as expanding Japanese interests in Southeast Asia 
seemed to confront Philippine aspirations for independence, 
increasing attention was directed at Japan's involvement in 
Davao. The American authorities, in particular, viewed the 
Davao region with growing concern but were generally careful 
to do nothing which could be interpreted, even indirectly, as 
inimical to Japanese interests. Moreover, the diplomatic efforts 
of the leaders of the Philippines were primarily devoted to the 
relaxation of Japanese-Philippine tensions, and Japanese repre-
sentatives in the Islands responded in kind. Therefore, in late 
1941, on the eve of World War II, the ultimate resolution of the 
Davao problem through behind-the-scenes negotiations between 
the Japanese Consulate General and the Philippine Common-
wealth executive indicated the extent of both sides' mutual com-
mitment to achieving a modus vivendi. 
Perhaps what is crucial to the historian of these events is 
that nothing in the record of Japanese-Philippine relations as 
exemplified in this case study of Davao can be described as hav-
ing contributed to the outbreak of Japanese-American hostilities 
in the Pacific. No evidence whatever exists to prove, as so many 
suggested, especially in the decade after 1931, that the Japanese 
colony at Davao was in any way a bridgehead for the ultimate 
seizure of the Philippines. At no time was Davao anything more 
than an outstanding example of what could be accomplished by 
the application of Japanese energy and ingenuity to an other-
wise somnolent and unproductive tropical area. Moreover, the 
Filipinos were neither frightened by nor overly concerned about 
the growth of Japanese economic interest in Davao. On the con-
trary, most Philippine leaders, though unable to air their views 
publicly owing to the continued American presence in the 
Islands, welcomed the Japanese contribution to the development 
of the Commonwealth. And, as the record demonstrates, many 
of these same Filipinos were in fact closely connected either 
politically or economically or both with Japanese activities at 
Davao. 
Tha t Japanese diplomats and businessmen were able to ingra-
tiate themselves with key Filipinos and were able to use these 
contacts to further their success in the Islands can hardly be 
considered a triumph of deviousness. Rather, these Japanese 
deserve full credit for the speed with which they learned to op-
erate within a Philippine context and for the tact and skill by 
means of which they achieved acceptance by Filipinos. The full 
extent of Japanese success in this regard became clearly evident 
during the World War II occupation of the Islands when the 
Japanese, as occupiers, were able to call upon so many key mem-
bers of the Filipino elite to serve in the occupation regime under 
Japanese supervision. And those Filipinos who served did so not 
because they were either "unpatriotic" or "patriotic" but be-
cause of the personal relations that had developed before the 
war between themselves and many Japanese whom they knew, 
trusted and, most importantly in their view, liked. 
The Japanese Settlement in Davao: 
Origins and Development 
The heart of the Japanese colony in the Philippines was the 
province and city of Davao1 on the island of Mindanao.2 Jap-
anese settlement in the Davao area had developed as a result of 
the coincidence of three factors: the need of the abaca (hemp) 
plantation owners3 for hardy and industrious laborers,4 the 
presence in the Philippines of unemployed Japanese who had 
originally been brought to the Islands by the American builders 
of the Benguet or Kennon zigzag road to Baguio in Mountain 
Province in Central Luzon, and the foresighted enterprise of 
K. S. Ohta (Ota Kyosaburo). 
Ohta (1876-1917) was a Kobe merchant who had come to 
Manila at the turn of the century with a profound belief in the 
future of Japanese-Philippine trade and who had made his mark 
both with the American authorities and his fellow Japanese by 
quelling discontent among the Baguio road gang through his 
provision of sorely missed Japanese necessities. It was logical, 
therefore, for Ohta to act as a kind of go-between or labor con-
tractor for the labor-seeking plantation owners and the job-
seeking Japanese, and with the encouragement of the insular 
government to arrange the importation of these laborers into 
Davao in 1904 and 1905.5 In 1905, Ohta himself settled perma-
nently in Davao, where he opened a general store catering to his 
Japanese clientele,6 and here Ohta became a kind of father con-
fessor to the homesick laborers and eventually unofficial leader 
of the Japanese community. 
At the outset the migration of Japanese laborers to Davao 
seems to have been motivated by the same purely economic 
stimulus which attracted them to work on the Baguio road. 
There is no evidence that any significant number of these men 
had thought of remaining permanently at Davao. Rather, they 
planned to return to Japan, taking with them their hard-earned 
savings. But the real agricultural potentialities of the broad 
undeveloped Davao region quickly became apparent to many 
of the laborers, almost all of whom were themselves of peasant 
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origin. The soil was fertile and was kept moist by a consistent 
and well distributed annual rainfall draining onto a watershed 
sloping from Mount Apo, the highest peak in the Philippines 
at 9,610 feet, to the seacoast. Moreover, the relatively mild and 
typhoon-free climate with its continuous growing season made 
life in Davao not dissimilar to life in Okinawa or in Kyushu or 
western Honshu, from which places most of the Japanese came. 
A further impetus to Japanese colonization resulted from the 
failure of most of the American ex-soldier planters to secure the 
necessary capital or to have the technical skill needed to pioneer 
in these newly opened lands. The rigors and hazards of tropical 
living, the loneliness and remoteness of Davao, and the general 
problems of adjusting to totally alien surroundings combined 
to contribute to an early exodus for all but a few of these Ameri-
can settlers. 
Thus, in 1906, with most of the Americans departed but the 
land's potentialities still evident, Ohta decided to develop an 
abaca plantation of his own by acquiring land from the aborigi-
nal Bagobo tribe. However, Ohta was called in by Governor 
Allen Walker of the Davao District and informed that since tribal 
lands were classified as public lands, and since, under the Philip-
pines Act of 1902, alien individuals could not acquire public 
lands, Ohta was illegally occupying public lands, and that if he 
did not evacuate those lands, court proceedings would be insti-
tuted.7 Ohta agreed to give up these lands within six months, 
though he could not have been compelled to do so without a suit 
being entered in court against him. 
However, having determined upon a policy of land acquisi-
tion, Ohta was not to be deterred, and he soon found the answer 
to his dilemma in the Public Land Act (Act No. 926) of 1903, 
which permitted any legally organized corporation to purchase 
or lease agricultural land in the public domain up to a maximum 
of 1,024 hectares (one hectare = 2.471 acres), leases being for 
twenty-five years and renewable for an additional 25 years.8 
When in May of 1907, Ohta established the Ohta Development 
Company with himself as majority stockholder, he invited in-
vestments from his compatriots, and a few of the laborers, very 
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wisely as events were to prove, put into Ohta's corporation the 
funds they had been saving for their return to Japan.9 Thus, the 
foundation of the Ohta Development Company and the Philip-
pine government's awarding it 1,015 hectares of public land 
for which it applied marked the beginning of a new era in the 
situation of the Japanese at Davao. 
Japanese were now landholders and land developers in their 
own right, and permanent colonization rather than transient 
residence became characteristic of the Japanese population of 
Davao. And, as the lands acquired under Public Act 926 pros-
pered, the urge to acquire additional lands grew greater, and the 
search on the part of the Japanese for legal loopholes by which 
landholdings might be expanded grew more intense. Simul-
taneously, the idea of resistance to the extension of the Japanese 
foothold at Davao became at least the private view of some of-
ficials of the American colonial administration as witness Gov-
ernor Walker's fearful prediction to the Secretary of the Moro 
Province on November 9, 1907: 
If the Japanese are allowed to secure a foothold and settle in such large 
numbers in one of the fairest spots and which bids fair to be one of the 
richest in the Moro Province and possibly in the Philippine Islands, the 
consequences in the future can easily be foretold.10 
However, American policy was not immediately affected 
by such forebodings, for by 1910, the Ohta Development Com-
pany's abaca harvest led that of all other planters in the Davao 
area, and in 1912, Ohta opened an export branch office in Ma-
nila.11 Now that Ohta had his own land, he eagerly and rapidly 
introduced the most advanced methods of cultivation, fertiliza-
tion, and irrigation. In addition, he encouraged experimenta-
tion not only in the growing and harvesting of abaca, but in the 
introduction of new and diverse agricultural products (fruits, 
vegetables, rubber, cotton, coffee) and even in the raising of 
chickens and pigs. Moreover, the success of the Ohta Develop-
ment Company stimulated the investment of new capital from 
Japan in the Davao region and the formation of a number of 
other Japanese-sponsored plantation corporations. Both the 
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arrival of new immigrants from Japan and the acquisition of 
new lands by the Japanese proceeded apace. 
World War I gave further impetus to the development of the 
abaca industry, and the Japanese were in the forefront of the 
hemp boom. In 1914, for example, the Furukawa Plantation 
Company was founded with Furukawa Yoshizo as president; and 
Leopoldo Aguinaldo (1885-1958), who had himself studied tex-
tile engineering in Japan at the Polytechnical Institute of Na-
goya from 1905 to 1909, was the only non-Japanese among the 
seven original incorporators.12 The Furukawa Company was 
subsequently to become, along with the Ohta Development 
Company, one of the two major Japanese concerns at Davao. 
Wartime naval expansion sent prices of "Manila hemp" 
spiraling still higher, and land under cultivation was increased 
as rapidly as possible. By 1916, an estimated 10,000 Japanese 
were in Davao;13 and by the end of 1918, out of 164 plantations 
in Davao, the Japanese owned 71, Americans 34, Filipinos 44, 
and other nationalities 15.14 Approximately 60% of the culti-
vated land area was in Japanese holdings, which averaged 797 
hectares each and which were producing hemp from 2,946 hec-
tares and copra from 29,311 coconut trees.15 
Despite the several existing legal barriers to land acquisition 
by aliens, therefore, the Japanese had by 1919 obviously dis-
covered a number of extralegal devices by which additional lands 
might be brought under their control. These included the pur-
chase of private lands (since no law as yet prohibited the sale of 
private property to aliens16); the subleasing for a contracted pe-
riod of lands held by American, Filipino, or Spanish individuals 
or corporations; the organization o$ smaller independent corpo-
rations by larger corporations, such as Ohta and Furukawa, 
through which more public lands could be leased within the 
1,024 hectare limitation;17 the leasing of lands obtained by Fili-
pino government officials in the names of their wives, relatives, 
or friends; the purchase or lease from the Philippine National 
Bank of lands confiscated from defaulting Filipino or American 
landowners; and even "marriage" to Bagobo and Manobo 
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women, who then used Japanese funds to purchase land,18 the 
title to which would remain in the women's hands. 
In an attempt to meet this situation the Philippine Legisla-
ture, over the protests of the Japanese settlers (protests supported 
by the Japanese government), passed the Public Land Act of 
1919,19 which provided that no individual or corporation could 
purchase or lease land unless 61 % of the capital stock was owned 
by a United States or Philippine citizen. While no additional 
lands were acquired by Japanese corporations after 1919, the 
effect of the new legislation on the Davao land question was much 
more apparent than real. In fact, claims have been made that 
the legislation was largely the result of pressure from the Philip-
pine legal profession, which then played a crucial role in drafting 
contractual agreements by which the Japanese might evade the 
new act. At any rate, after 1919, the two principal means of 
Japanese land acquisition became the dummy corporation, whose 
Filipino incorporators were well paid for their "trouble/'20 and 
the so-called pakiaw (pakiao, paquiao) system. 
The latter arrangement made it appear that the Filipino 
landowner was in effect hiring the personal services of the Jap-
anese. The pakiaw contract provided that the Japanese was to 
be employed to clear the land, to plant abaca at his own ex-
pense, and, when the abaca was two years old, to be paid one peso 
for every "hill" of abaca planted by him. If the landholder 
failed to pay the one peso per "hill," and such failure was stand-
ard procedure, the contract further provided that the Japanese 
was to retain possession of the land for from ten to fifteen years, 
during which time he would continue to clear the land, cultivate 
abaca, strip the fiber, and receive from 85 to 90% of the profits, 
the rest going to the Filipino landholder. Moreover, the Japanese 
cultivator was to bear all the expenses of land development and 
improvement and even pay the taxes.21 
The effect of the 1919 legislation and especially the effects of 
the dummy corporation and pakiaw system on the landholding 
pattern in Davao may be seen in a report of the Provincial Treas-
urer of Davao for 1930, which lists the number of plantations 
owned by different nationalities. Japanese-owned plantations de-
5 
sociation of Davao stated that although during the Philippine 
political season it was customary for candidates to try to publi-
cize themselves by hurling imprecations at the Japanese, there 
was no real cause for concern. Rather, it suggested, there was 
understanding between the Japanese and the local population, 
and the Filipinos welcomed the arrival of the Japanese in Davao. 
The same document emphasized the general harmony evident 
within the Japanese community as well and predicted a promis-
ing future for the area.31 Since the Japanese themselves, and 
most particularly the leaders of their community association, 
would have been the first to complain to the Japanese govern-
ment about mistreatment of any kind or to report to their home 
government any potential threats to their interests, such an 
evaluation ought to be given full credence as a fair depiction of 
the situation of the Davao Japanese in mid-1930. 
It is also worthwhile to examine some of the evidence on the 
official American view of the Japanese colony in Davao since, 
during the 1930's when the Davao question became an often in-
flammatory issue in Philippine politics, the charge was frequently 
leveled by Filipino politicians that the buildup of the Japanese 
concentration at Davao had taken place with not only the con-
sent but with the encouragement of the American authorities. 
On September 2, 1925, Colonel Carmi A. Thompson, who had 
been sent to the Philippines as a special representative of Presi-
dent Coolidge, made a full day's inspection of Davao. Colonel 
Thompson met with the leaders of the Davao Japanese Associa-
tion, inspected the experiment station with the hemp stripping 
machine of the Furukawa Plantation Company and made a brief 
rest stop at the Ohta Development Company. He told his Jap-
anese hosts that he was already well acquainted with the fact that 
the development of Davao Province was a result of Japanese ef-
forts. Colonel Thompson further said that he recognized that 
the introduction of capital investments and the application of 
machine power by the Japanese had made the progress in Davao 
possible. In summarizing the visit of this presidential emissary, 
the Japanese consular representative in Davao wrote, "[Colonel 
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Thompson] demonstrated that he had a favorable attitude toward 
the developmental activities of the Japanese here/ '3 2 
An equally informative insight into the attitude of a key 
American official was contained in a February, 1929, secret report 
from the Consul General in Manila to the Foreign Office con-
cerning the attitude toward the Japanese of former Philippine 
Governor General Henry L. Stimson, by then the newly ap-
pointed Secretary of State. After praising Stimson's general un-
derstanding of and impartiality toward foreigners, the Consul 
General noted that throughout his tenure in the Islands Stimson 
had always demonstrated goodwill toward Japan, especially by 
rejecting on the grounds of international mutuality legislation 
seeking to restrict Japanese agricultural, fishing, and lumbering 
enterprises. According to the Consul General, Stimson had had 
only praise for the organization and orderliness of the Japanese 
undertakings at Davao, and he had pointed to them as examples 
of what Filipinos themselves might do to develop their own 
country. Though as Governor General, Stimson had visited 
Mindanao several times, he had never visited Davao. When he 
was asked why he had not done so, he replied that it was not 
necessary to inspect an area where there were no complaints.33 
Nevertheless, despite the generally favorable situation in 
Davao itself and the broadly tolerant attitude of American offi-
cials during the 1920,s, the existence of a tightly knit, well or-
ganized, capably led, and economically thriving Japanese 
community in the Philippines did arouse anxiety in some quar-
ters. T h e attention of the Philippine government was called to 
the Davao "problem" on numerous occasions, especially by the 
press, and the plea that "something must be done" became a 
fairly familiar one. So vocal did some of these critics become 
that in 1926, a committee of officials of the Bureau of Lands 
headed by its Assistant Director carried out an on-the-scene in-
vestigation in Davao of the business dealings and management of 
all the Japanese corporations, searching for any substantiation of 
alleged land-law violations. After two months of intensive study 
of the situation, the committee reported that all the charges made 
were totally without foundation and that, contrary to what had 
9 
been suggested, the Japanese, acting wholly within the law, had 
made great contributions to the agricultural development of 
Davao.34 
T h e results of the Bureau of Lands investigation were not 
unexpected in the era between the end of World War I and the 
Manchurian Incident, a period which saw perhaps the most un-
impeded growth of the Japanese settlement in Davao. The lack 
of obstacles to Japan's progress was the result of several factors: 
diligent and thorough diplomatic activity on the part of Japan's 
consular representatives in both Manila and Davao; tolerant en-
couragement of the introduction of foreign capital into the Phil-
ippines by Governors General appointed by Republican ad-
ministrations in Washington; successful lobbying by Japanese 
business interests among Filipino legislators and provincial of-
ficials; a desire by Filipino lawyers, dummy corporations and 
pakiaw "landlords" to leave undisturbed what were for them 
very satisfactory arrangements; the generally favorable attitude 
of the Bagobo tribesmen in Davao toward the Japanese, whom 
they preferred to the Christianized Filipinos;35 and the Ameri-
can—Japanese "honeymoon" era in international politics, re-
flected in the several Washington Treaties of 1922 and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. 
In an interview published in the Manila Tribune in Septem-
ber, 1929, Trade Commissioner Howard of the Philippines de-
nied once again that there was any Japanese violation of land laws 
in Davao or any so-called Japanese menace. On the contrary the 
Commissioner affirmed that there was a voluntary influx of Fili-
pino workers into Davao, where they were assured good wages 
and decent living conditions on Japanese plantations. Moreover, 
he praised the Japanese for their having constructed at their own 
expense some two hundred kilometers of roads in the Davao 
region and for their experimentation leading to improved meth-
ods of growing and stripping abaca. Said Howard: 
Davao is fast becoming the greatest hemp producing province in the 
Philippines, due largely to the very progressive methods and splendid 
organization of the Japanese planters there.36 
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The Alunan Report and the Free Press 'Letter' 
The relative equilibrium and equanimity of the Japanese at 
Davao were seriously disturbed for the first time by the so-called 
Alunan Report in 1930. In April of that year Rafael Alunan, 
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, made an 
inspection tour of the southern Philippines including Mindanao 
and on his return submitted to the Governor General a report 
which was made public May 22. In his report Alunan made a 
number of recommendations for policies in the area. Of par-
ticular significance to Philippine-Japanese relations was his 
statement that Davao appeared to be "a small Japanese colony" 
and his proposal that "in the light of the information obtained 
in my recent trip to Mindanao concerning the port of Davao, I 
believe that the question of closing it as a port of entry deserves 
some attention. . . ."37 Alunan elaborated his views on the latter 
suggestion by noting that the opening of Davao as a port of entry 
had been prejudicial to the expansion of inter-island shipping, 
which, because it was still in its infancy, needed all possible as-
sistance. He emphasized that if Davao had not been opened as a 
port of entry, "all the products that the Japanese are exporting di-
rectly to Japan would necessarily be sent to Zamboanga, Cebu or 
Manila and the coastwise trade would be benefited that 
much "38 
As might have been anticipated, swift reaction to the Alunan 
report came from several quarters. The Philippines Herald, 
which was owned by the influential shipping magnate Vicente 
Madrigal, strongly supported Alunan's position and concluded 
its vehement editorial with the words, "By all means Davao 
should be a closed port. It should be put back where it always 
belonged."39 The other two Manila English-language dailies, 
the Tribune and the Bulletin, both took vigorous issue with 
Secretary Alunan. T h e Tribune denounced him as having 
"naively pronounced" a "fallacious economic philosophy,"40 
while the Bulletin editorialized that if Alunan's policies were 
followed the results would be "suicidal."41 
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Representative Isidro Vamenta of Misamis Province on Min-
danao, who had recently visited Davao, declared his opposition 
to the closing of the port of Davao and said that Japanese land-
holdings were ''apparently occupied in accordance with the 
law."42 Collector of Customs Vicente Aldanese also opposed 
Alunan's recommendations,43 as did Secretary of Finance Miguel 
Unson, who predicted that if Davao were closed as a port of 
entry, the accompanying rise in transportation costs would 
destroy Davao's trade. Samuel Gaches, prominent American 
businessman and community spokesman, who had also recently 
visited Davao, said that not only Japanese but Filipino and 
American businessmen as well would suffer from any closing of 
the port of Davao. 
Leaders of the Davao Japanese community naturally voiced 
their opposition to the Alunan proposals. They did so by denials 
that the domestic or foreign trade of Davao was Japanese-domi-
nated and by threats to move their hemp-growing operations to 
the Netherlands East Indies.44 Japanese Consul General Koshida 
Saichiro, summarizing the situation for the Foreign Ministry, 
wrote: 
This problem deeply concerns the Japanese in Davao. Though from 
evaluating present opinion it seems that no change will take place, con-
sidering that the source of this problem is the person who occupies the 
key position of Secretary o£ Agriculture and Natural Resources it must 
be viewed rather gravely.45 
While the controversy engendered by Secretary Alunan's re-
port continued, one of the Secretary's principal deputies, Serafin 
Hilado, Chief of the Bureau of Lands of the Department of Ag-
riculture and Natural Resources, sent word through Jose P. 
Laurel, Manila consulting attorney to the Ohta Development 
Company, that he would like to have a talk with Japanese Consul 
General Koshida. On July 17, 1930, the two men met. In what 
seemed to be a follow-up to the questions raised by Alunan, Hi-
lado evidenced his concern about Davao lands acquired in the 
past by the Japanese through marriage or common-law relations 
with local women, through pakiaw contracts, or through the ex-
tension of credit by Japanese companies to other companies 
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which were in reality Japanese-controlled.46 Koshida replied 
that marriage was certainly not illegal and that the legality or 
illegality of the pakiaw system was still a moot question. How-
ever, his meeting with Hilado coming on the heels of the Alunan 
statement greatly troubled the Consul General, who called in 
Morokuma Yasaku, the head of the Ohta Development Com-
pany and President of the Japanese Association of Manila, to 
discuss the points raised by Hilado and to plan counter strategy. 
The two men decided that the best chance to gain an under-
standing of the Japanese side of the Davao problems raised by 
Alunan and Hilado lay with the "politically motivated" Philip-
pine Legislature.47 
On July 24, Watanabe Kaoru, Manila representative of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, invited Senator Benigno S. 
Aquino, Chairman of the Mindanao and Sulu Survey Commit-
tee, who had been described as a "person trusted by Senate 
President Pro Tern [Sergio] Osmena/ ' to eat at the Fujikawa 
Hotel where Watanabe was living. During the meal Watanabe 
asked Aquino his views on the land contract situation at Davao, 
and Aquino answered that such contracts were not contrary to the 
land laws. Meanwhile, Morokuma met with his good friend 
Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, whose opinion was identical 
with that of Aquino, after which Morokuma asked one of his con-
sulting attorneys, Pablo Lorenzo of Zamboanga, to sound out 
Osmena. Much to the consternation of the Japanese, Morokuma 
reported to Consul General Koshida that Osmena had told Lo-
renzo that the situation could not be left as it was because of all 
of the interest that had been aroused. Osmena further stated 
that since this was a question affecting foreign relations, its reso-
lution depended on unreserved mutual understanding and that 
his hope was to limit the number of Japanese landing at Davao.48 
Koshida told Morokuma that Japan could not agree to any such 
restrictions, for if Japan did agree, as China earlier had, this 
would undoubtedly be only a first step in an attempt to end all 
immigration of Japanese. Thus, both the Consul General and 
the President of the Japanese Association of Manila determined 
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to avoid any such proposal and to strive to prevent the realization 
of Osmena's recommendation.49 
The wisdom of Consul General Koshida's belief that Alunan 
and Hilado could best be countered through the Philippine 
Legislature was well supported by the contents of a letter which 
was addressed by Senate President Quezon to a leading Japanese 
businessman with interests in the Philippines: 
Aboard S. S. Empress 
of Japan 
At port in Yakohama, 
Japan 
August 14, 1930 
My dear Mr. Inouye: 
Referring to the question which you asked me about the closing 
of the port of Davao, I wish to reiterate what I told you, namely: that the 
statements attributed to Secretary Alunan to that effect is [sic] not true. 
The Philippine Government, realizing the importance of Davao as a 
port of entry, has spent considerable money on wharves and other im-
provements to facilitate the unloading by ships of large tonnage, and it 
will be unthinkable, after so much work done, to close the port now to 
foreign entry. 
I wish you would convey to your associates in your company the idea 
that the Philippine Government is not unsympathetic to Japanese capital, 
and that therefore they should not pay any attention to rumors and news-
paper reports to the contrary. You may rest assured that legitimate Jap-
anese investments in the Philippines which are made under our laws will 
be duly protected and will receive as much sympathetic consideration from 
our Government and people as if given to Filipino capital itself. 
Thanking you for your courtesies, and hoping that the little souvenir 
I am sending you from the Philippines will be accepted as a token of my 
personal regard, 
Very cordially yours, 
(sgd) MANUEL L. QUEZON 
Mr. N. Inouye, 
No. 9, Nishitenjin, 
Nishisuma, 
Kobe, Japan50 
Indeed, despite the opinion of Osmena earlier reported by 
Morokuma, meaningful support for the views of Secretary 
Alunan was noticeably lacking among the Filipino ruling elite. 
The sentiments of Quezon were those which prevailed, and the 
Alunan proposal died aborning. 
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Also during the month of August, 1930, still another op-
portunity developed in which the Japanese Consulate General 
could make its influence felt among the Filipino legislators. This 
was a so-called unofficial visit to the Islands by a South Seas In-
spection Party of the House of Representatives of the Japanese 
Diet. The seven-member party (four Minseito and three Seiyu-
kai) arrived in Davao where they were met by Governor General 
Dwight F. Davis on August 12, and left the following day, arriv-
ing in Manila August 16, and staying until the 22nd. An espe-
cially warm welcome was extended to the Japanese group by the 
Philippine Legislature, including a luncheon on August 20, at 
the private home of Senate President Pro Tempore Osmena with 
fourteen leading members of both Houses as special guests and 
nine leaders of the local Japanese community as honor guests. 
The same afternoon at four o'clock House Speaker Pro Tempore 
Antonio de las Alas gave a formal reception and champagne 
party in his office, immediately followed by a joint legislative ses-
sion at which a speech of welcome was delivered by Representa-
tive Arsenio Bonifacio and a brief statement of thanks was given 
in Japanese by the head of the Diet mission Okamoto Jitsutaro. 
Representative Bonifacio's remarks were even more effusive 
than one familiar with the practices of Filipino oratory might 
have anticipated. He termed the visit of the Japanese delegation 
4'one of the eventful episodes in the common history of the two 
neighboring nations" and "an added link to the chain of friend-
ship that binds the two peoples in whose veins runs the adven-
turous Malay blood."51 He enumerated and lavished praise on 
such Japanese characteristics as thrift, industriousness, chivalry, 
and appreciation of beauty, and he voiced the hope that an inde-
pendent Philippines could in the future emulate Japan's remark-
able advances in finance, business, and industry.52 Okamoto's 
reply was very brief, most humble, full of respect for the rapid 
progress of the Filipinos toward self-government and notably 
lacking in any political overtones. 
After the Diet delegation had come and gone, Consul Gen-
eral Koshida reported to the Foreign Office that all members of 
the parliamentary delegation had, in accordance with Koshida's 
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instructions, exercised great caution in both words and deeds. In 
fact, the Japanese Consul General judged the visit to have suc-
ceeded in carrying out a friendly exchange which had proved 
very favorable to Japan. He was particularly pleased with this 
result, since he noted that public opinion in the Philippines had 
been rather disturbed as a result of the recent publicity given to 
the situation in Davao by the Alunan Report and had mistakenly 
believed that the Diet party had come to the Islands principally 
to inspect conditions in Davao and to consider the problems of 
Japanese-Philippine relations. However, Koshida stated that 
because of the very brief period of time the mission spent in 
Davao such an erroneous conception of the purpose of their 
trip had been quickly dispelled. If, on the other hand, said Ko-
shida, the Diet group had stayed in Davao a fairly long time, this 
would in the light of recent events in the Philippines have given 
rise to various speculations and opinions which could be of con-
cern in the future.53 
That there was still the possibility of stirring up controversy 
about Davao was, however, made very evident by a series of ex-
pose-styled articles appearing during the fall of 1930, in the in-
fluential American-owned weekly magazine Philippines Free 
Press. T h e series was climaxed with the publication in the Oc-
tober 18 issue of the magazine of "an astonishing secret letter." 
T h e purported letter was supposed to have been written some 
fourteen years earlier in 1916, and to have come at that time 
into the hands of the Free Press, which claimed to have refrained 
from publishing it then in the interest of Japanese-American re-
lations. The sensational document was said to have been com-
posed by Japanese interests in the Philippines for delivery to 
the then Prime Minister of Japan Count Okuma Shigenobu by 
Okuma's close friend Dr. Nitobe Inazo, who had reached Manila 
on March 29, 1916, as a member of a Japanese South Seas Tour 
Party of some 61 persons. According to the Free Press, a loyal, 
patriotic Filipino who worked for the Japanese had secured a 
copy and delivered it to the Free Press. 
The core of the letter, as published in English by the Free 
Press, was a proposal that Japan purchase the Philippines from 
16 
the United States, and that in return for America's agreement to 
sell, Japan would pledge never again to permit Japanese laborers 
to immigrate to the United States. This recommendation was 
bolstered by such reasons in the alleged text of the letter as that 
the Philippines had been a bone of contention in the United 
States since their acquisition, that the annual population growth 
in Japan was 600,000, necessitating some place to which the sur-
plus population could migrate, and that while the United States 
needed Japanese labor, it was determined to exclude it. There-
fore, the letter maintained, for a price in the neighborhood of 
P400,000,000 exclusive of railroads, the United States would be 
rid of the Islands, and Japan would be rid of its surplus popula-
tion. And finally the Philippines would then form, together 
with the Kuriles and the Carolines, an island bulwark assuring 
Japan's security. 
Having at last published what it termed "this audacious let-
ter / ' in the same issue the Free Press proceeded to editorialize: 
While American and Filipino officials drift along, allowing things to 
take their course and pursuing a general laissez-faire theory, the Japanese 
are planning definitely for the future. The series of articles on Davao 
published in the Free Press climaxed this week with the startling revela-
tions on page two, definitely prove that fact. 
No nation in the world has progressed with the leaps and bounds that 
Japan has in the past two or three decades. From comparative obscurity, 
Japan has risen to a world power, which must be considered in every 
meeting of the great nations. And Japan's designs on the Philippines are 
far from a myth. 
Compare the systematic and organized Japanese methods with the 
wavering and vacillating attitude of the United States—which seems to 
include a change in insular administrations every couple of years—and 
the helter-skelter policy of local politicians—interested only in self-ag-
grandizement—and you will realize what the future must inevitably hold 
for the Philippines.54 
Consul General Koshida, in reporting and analyzing for the 
Foreign Office this latest outburst of what he termed anti-Jap-
anese propaganda, attributed the attitude of the Free Press in 
part to riding the crest of the wave of criticism directed at the 
Japanese in Davao since the publication of Secretary Alunan's 
report and in part to the presence on the Free Press staff of an 
American editor and three other Americans, one of whom was 
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reported to have a connection with the traditionally anti-Jap-
anese Hearst press. The latter individual, according to Koshida, 
wanted, in line with the local American Chamber of Commerce, 
to prevent American withdrawal from the Philippines.55 
As far as the letter itself was concerned, the Consul General 
reported that a search of the consulate's files showed that a South 
Seas Observation Party organized during 1916 by the O.S.K. 
steamship company with the assistance of the Taiwan Govern-
ment General had reached Manila on March 29, and had re-
mained 31 hours. The group then sailed on the 20th for Zam-
boanga, where it stayed 11 hours en route to Sandakan, North 
Borneo. According to the records, while in Manila the party 
had been given a reception at the consulate, where the head 
of the local Mitsui branch talked on the development of Philip-
pine industry and Dr. Nitobe spoke on South Seas economic de-
velopment. However, there was no trace whatever of any such 
letter as the one reported by the Free Press.56 
Although Consul General Koshida concluded that the letter 
must be a forgery, he said that since there was always a remote 
possibility that the letter might have emanated from some source 
unknown to him, the consulate could not afford to dismiss it out 
of hand if questions were raised about it. Rather, he proposed 
that if there should be any queries about the letter, the consulate 
should reply truthfully that it had absolutely no knowledge of 
such a document and should comment on it in terms of its date, 
its unofficial character and the preposterousness of its contents. 
But, Koshida concluded, he doubted that any of this would be 
necessary since, despite what he believed to have been the obvious 
intent of the Free Press to stimulate anti-Japanese feelings, there 
had neither been any apparent Filipino reactions to the letter 
nor had any other organs of the Philippine press published any 
opinions in regard to it.57 
Nevertheless, American concern over the developing Jap-
anese enclave at Davao continued to be evident. Worrisome re-
act ionsin the United States were undoubtedly stimulated by 
both the'"statesmanship" of the Alunan Report and the sensa-
tionalism of the Free Press articles. For example, when on 
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February 10, 1931, former Philippines Governor General W. 
Cameron Forbes, then United States Ambassador to Japan, ar-
rived in Manila to pay a visit to Governor General Dwight Davis, 
the New York Times chose the occasion to review what was called 
the "peaceful economic invasion" of Davao.58 The Times esti-
mated that the Japanese population of Davao Province was then 
10,000 and that 85% of hemp production in the Philippines was 
"handled by Japanese/ ' This included both the shipping of 
hemp on Japanese vessels and the utilization of Japanese laborers 
on American or Filipino plantations as well as on Japanese-
owned plantations. 
The Times also noted that Japanese labor was not only more 
efficient but more economical than Filipino labor since the Jap-
anese were willing to work under a crop-share plan, whereby 
the plantation owner held a crop auction in the presence of his 
laborers, and they in turn were paid a specified share of the 
amount for which the abaca crop was sold. Moreover, according 
to the same report, the Japanese had introduced machine strip-
ping, which meant both increased and cheaper production of 
hemp with less labor. Further, the Times stated, it was the Jap-
anese who had increased the profit margin still more by the utili-
zation of hemp waste, especially by establishing an experimental 
paper mill. Since the normal profit margin in hemp was rarely 
over 15%, that margin was most often determined by the econo-
mies of production and by the utilization of byproducts. In con-
clusion the Times noted that the latest suggestion for dealing 
with the Japanese influx was the Alunan-instigated proposal for 
closing the port of Davao, a proposal which, as the Times viewed 
it, had been foredoomed by virtue of the fact that the transport 
of hemp to Zamboanga would so add to the cost of the hemp 
that the profit would be eliminated and the abaca industry with 
it.59 
Investigations of Davao: A merican and Philippine 
Within the year that followed, Japanese aggression in Man-
churia and the Japanese attack on Shanghai, both in seeming dis-
regard of accepted international practices, profoundly affected 
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American public opinion. In the United States increased atten-
tion was focused on the security of the Philippines, and once 
more the Japanese settlement in Davao was in the limelight. In 
line with this concern, on February 11, 1932, Acting Governor 
General George Butte made an official inspection of the Davao 
region. After holding a public hearing at which he heard some 
testimony very critical of the Japanese and after a brief tour of 
the area, he returned to Manila and had the Bureau of Customs 
promulgate over his signature Customs Administrative Order 
No. 284, which designated Manila as "the only port where alien 
immigrants or returning residents may enter from abroad/'60 
Prior to the issuance of this order immigrants had been per-
mitted to enter the Philippines through the subports of Iloilo, 
Cebu, Zamboanga, Jolo, and Davao, as well as through Manila, 
but ostensibly Chinese immigration required closer supervision 
and control, and therefore subports were to be eliminated.61 
However, Dr. Butte on his return from Davao was quoted as 
having said that the district was "entirely in the hands of the 
Japanese" and that, while they had done "wonderful work in 
commercial expansion," they presented a "natural strategic prob-
lem, since 12,000 are concentrated in a small area and control 
the political and economic life of the entire province/'62 When 
it was also made known that the Acting Governor General had, 
at the same time the new order on immigration was made pub-
lic, reserved by executive order vast tracts of land in Davao for 
homesteads and had canceled some one hundred applications of 
Filipinos seeking shore leases on the Gulf of Davao because the 
applicants were "acting for Japanese third parties,"63 there was 
no doubt at all that his actions were directed at the Japanese. 
The Davao question was once more in the forefront of Philip-
pine politics and of Japanese-American relations. 
In a memorandum to the Secretary of War with reference to 
the above press reports, General F. Le J. Parker, Chief of the 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, defended Dr. Butte by saying that 
"action and comment of the type alleged are matters of discre-
tional judgment on the part of the Philippine Chief Executive."64 
Parker also stated that based on his personal observations in the 
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summer of 1931 there was an "undesirable concentration of Jap-
anese immigration and influence in Davao Province and that . . . 
further extension of that influence is not improbable and not in 
the best interests of the Filipino people."65 There is a strong in-
dication in the same memorandum that Gen. Parker was in fact 
pleased with the possible effect in the Islands of the remarks of 
the Acting Governor General since "until quite recently, the 
general public attitude of the Filipino leaders has been that the 
Philippine Islands had nothing to fear from Japanese immigra-
tion or penetration."66 
Subsequently on March 5, 1932, a cablegram was received 
in Washington from Governor Butte, replying to an earlier 
message from General Parker asking about the accuracy of the 
press reports of Butte's statements.67 Butte reported that he had 
only inspected the municipality of Davao and that the * 'generali-
zations' ' contained in the press were therefore inaccurate for the 
province though accurate for the municipality. There were, he 
said, 12,507 Japanese in Davao Province (total population 139,-
000), the majority of whom lived in Davao City (population 21,-
500). It was estimated, he reported, that Japanese interests 
controlled all of Davao's timber production, 80% of its hemp 
production and 50% of its copra production. During 1931, of 
the ships entering the port at Davao, twelve were American, six-
teen were British, one was Dutch, one was Norwegian, and 65 
were Japanese.68 
Dr. Butte attributed his statement on the extent of Japanese 
political influence among the elected officials of Davao, all of 
whom were Filipinos, to reports received from the Director of 
the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and from the Deputy Gov-
ernor of Davao and to his own observations. Therefore, con-
tended Butte, Davao with its large Japanese population, its Jap-
anese-controlled harbor and Japanese-owned docks, and some 
325 kilometers of Japanese-built private roads is a ' 'potential 
military base," and any measures taken to impede its rapid de-
velopment were warranted. As far as the executive order closing 
subports as ports of entry for aliens was concerned, he said that 
it was issued on unanimous recommendation of the cabinet and 
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was directed principally at the Chinese but gave discretionary 
authority to local Collectors of Customs to make exceptions. As 
far as the lease cancellations were concerned, Butte concluded, 
an executive order in 1921 had set aside the Davao waterfront as 
a provincial reservation, and thus the Provincial Board was for-
bidden to alienate those lands, so that the specific permits now 
withdrawn had never been valid anyway.69 
Although subsequent mollifying statements by Consul Gen-
eral Kimura Atsushi,70 plus the revocation of Customs Adminis-
trative Order No. 284 on June 23, 1932,71 and a consequent 
resumption of the former system of subports of entry for immi-
grants, eased the somewhat tense atmosphere created by Butte's 
actions, it was clear that two new factors had entered the picture 
of the situation of the Japanese settlement in Davao. One was, 
as noted earlier, Japan's aggression in and conquest of Man-
churia, and the other was the increasing possibility that the 
American Congress would grant independence to the Philip-
pines. Moreover, these two developments were very much re-
lated to each other. For the Japanese action in Manchuria had 
turned the spotlight on the whole question of Philippine security 
and placed in rather dramatic highlight the problem of the 
ability of an independent Philippines to defend itself. Thus, the 
concentration of Japanese in Davao quite suddenly assumed en-
tirely new and seemingly much more menacing overtones as it 
affected both Philippine-American and Japanese-American re-
lations. 
As far as action by the Filipinos themselves in regard to the 
Japanese in Davao was concerned, in late 1931, the House of 
Representatives of the Philippine Legislature passed a resolution 
setting up a special Committee to Investigate Mindanao Lands 
in order to examine thoroughly the problem of illegal acquisition 
of land. The Committee was to carry out its investigation and 
report its findings and recommendations to the next session of 
the Legislature. Though the Committee was charged generally 
to study the land situation in Mindanao, it was obvious that its 
principal objective was to try to clarify the current status of land-
holding by the Japanese. The committee's own inspection team 
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was made up of nine of the twelve House members appointed 
to the Committee plus two secretaries. They left Manila on 
April 25, 1932, following the close of the legislative session and 
returned on May 17. 
The Committee was actually in Davao from April 30, to May 
8, when they left to return to Manila via Cotabato, Lanao, and 
Zamboanga. Their method of operation at Davao was to spend 
several hours each day receiving visitors, hearing appeals of 
various sorts, and holding public hearings. In addition, sub-
committees made up of two or three Representatives made field 
inspection side trips to various key hemp growing areas. The 
Committee's visit created a few peculiar problems of its own and 
aroused an interesting variety of reactions. 
From the time the inspection mission was publicly an-
nounced, the various Japanese firms in Davao—Ohta, Furukawa, 
etc.—planned welcoming celebrations and receptions of their 
own for the group. However, subsequent consideration of the 
idea and consultation with the Acting Consul of Japan in Davao, 
Vice Consul Kaneko Toyoji (on Feb. 6, 1932, the Davao Con-
sular Annex had been raised to a Consulate), led to the cancella-
tion of these affairs in order that they not become targets of criti-
cism. But Consul Kaneko decided that he himself, as a represen-
tative of a neighboring and friendly country, might well give a 
tea party for the group in order to exchange courtesies. Never-
theless, after the Committee arrived in Davao and the invitation 
was extended, Kaneko was informed that the visiting legislators 
were much too busy to accept any social obligations. When word 
filtered back to certain of the Representatives that the Consul 
was somewhat offended at the summary brushoff his proffered 
hospitality had been given, the Committeemen were highly in-
censed since the negative response had been arbitrarily made 
by the Chairman, Representative Fabian de la Paz, acting en-
tirely on his own. Finally, pressure from his colleagues forced 
Representative de la Paz to extend apologies to Consul Kaneko.72 
At a public hearing of the Committee on May 6, the same 
witnesses who had evidenced their hostility in testimony before 
Acting Governor General Butte in February appeared to com-
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plain of illegal acquisition of land by the Japanese and of corrupt 
practices on the part of Filipino officials. However, Consul 
Kaneko noted that the complainants were known locally as *'no-
torious characters'' and that their testimony was considered to 
be little more than a way of attracting attention to themselves. 
Thus it seemed to create almost no impact.73 Nevertheless, Ka-
neko did remark that while many of the local Filipino officials 
and influential individuals who in the past had themselves leased 
to the Japanese farm land sold by the government or had ar-
ranged such leases outwardly showed indifference toward the 
investigation or advocated a boycott of the inspection party, 
their seeming unconcern was only a facade for what was in reality 
a profound sense of uneasiness.74 As specific examples, the Jap-
anese Consul General mentioned then Davao Governor Juan 
Sarenas and Chief of the Davao office of the Bureau of Lands 
Reyes. Sarenas who had long been an attorney for several Jap-
anese firms said he regarded the investigating committee as mean-
ingless since, if there were anomalies, it would have been proper 
for his office and for the local branch of the Bureau of Lands to 
investigate at the local level rather than to send a high-powered 
group from Manila. Reyes stated that although the Committee 
was supposed to investigate whether there had been any viola-
tions of the land laws by either Filipino or Japanese, coming to 
Davao like ordinary tourists and spending only a week there 
could hardly accomplish anything.75 
After the Committee's return to Manila, the press was full 
of rumors of their supposed findings and of possible proposed 
solutions. Most of these reports emphasized the theme of pre-
sumed illegal acquisition of land by the Japanese in Davao and 
of possible connivance of Filipino officials in this process. The 
principal rumored solutions proposed to these problems were 
either the cancellation of illegally acquired land ownership by 
legislative action or the outright purchase of Japanese-held lands 
by Filipino or American capital or by the issuance of bonds by 
the Philippine government. 
Since, however, it was in fact extremely difficult to prove or 
disprove most of the charges against the Japanese of illegally ac-
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quiring land,76 and since the tireless lobbying of the consulate 
and of representatives of the Japanese community made remedial 
legislative action almost impossible, the net result of the investi-
gation of the special committee of the Philippine House of 
Representatives was the passage on September 12, 1932, by the 
Legislature of a Joint Resolution accompanied by an explana-
tory statement. The statement noted four significant facts about 
the Japanese in Davao: the lack of any restriction on Japanese 
immigration to the Philippines and the opening of a direct 
steamship route from Japan to Davao had both contributed 
to a rising trend in the number of Japanese arrivals there; the 
concentration of Japanese population in Davao had now 
reached 15,000; many Filipinos in Davao had leased the maxi-
mum 1,024 hectares of public land from the government only 
in order to sublease the same land in turn to the Japanese; 
and since the Chinese began boycotting Japanese goods in 
reaction to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the number 
of Japanese retail stores had increased greatly. The Joint 
Resolution, therefore, simply called on the executive branch to 
enforce the land laws as strictly as possible.77 
Davao: A Continuing Japanese Success Story 
Implicit, of course, in the outcome of the Philippine legisla-
tive investigation of Davao was the recognition of the fact that 
the Japanese had indeed made a success of the Davao settlement. 
Statistics, including those supplied by the Japanese, as well as 
overt evidence made it very clear that restrictive legislation, for 
example the Land Law of 1919 (Act No. 2874), had failed to 
impede the growth of the Japanese stake in Davao. Figures of 
the provincial assessor of Davao Province for 1932 showed that 
as of that year there were 25 Japanese controlled firms with hold-
ings in excess of 1,000 acres and that total Japanese landholdings 
included:78 
Purchased from the government with titles 2,986 acres 
Purchased from individuals 10,516 acres 
Leased from the government 53,401 acres 
Leased from individuals 13,259 acres 
Total 80,162 acres 
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The assessed value for 1932 of taxable property (land value only 
since improvements were not assessed in the provinces) owned 
by the Japanese was said to be P7,317,090.79 
In a secret report to the Foreign Office in June of 1932, Act-
ing Consul at Davao Vice Consul Kaneko Toyoji listed Japanese 
investments in the province of Davao as follows:80 
Agricultural Companies P20,000,000 
(43 companies and one individual) 
Self-sustaining Persons P10,000,000 
(About 2,000 tenants) 
Self-sustaining persons on foreigners' cultivated land P 5,000,000 
(About 500 persons) 
Commercial and industrial enterprises P 5,000,000 
(About 200) 
Lumbering and sawmill enterprises P 1,600,000 
(7) 
Fishing enterprises P 200,000 
(15) 
Total P41,800,000 
As far as population was concerned, Acting Consul Kaneko 
stated that as of 1932 there were 12,992 Japanese in Davao, of 
whom 7,327 were farm laborers and their families.81 
Generally speaking, however, Filipinos did not at this junc-
ture evidence any great concern about the Japanese in Davao. 
Nevertheless, the American authorities, and in particular Gov-
ernor General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who had been appointed 
to his post in February, 1932, increasingly interested themselves 
in the Davao situation. In June, 1932, Roosevelt himself made 
a personal visit to the region, where he heard repeated every 
charge that had been made to former Acting Governor General 
Butte, as well as to the Philippine legislative investigating com-
mittee. Roosevelt recorded his findings and opinions in a 
lengthy confidential letter to General Parker. 
Roosevelt wrote that he saw the Japanese making marked 
advances in every aspect of their endeavors because " their or-
ganization is compact and sound at every stage, their leadership 
able, their technical advisory aid the best obtainable, and, if 
they dominate the commerce and agriculture of the Davao area, 
as assuredly they do, it is not because of numbers, for they are 
26 
outnumbered twelve to one, but because of sheer demonstrated 
efficiency/'82 The Governor General, however, saw a num-
ber of disadvantages accruing from the dominant position of 
the Japanese in Davao: they had secured veritable control of 
the richest agricultural and timber lands in the area; they had 
greatly reduced the commercial importance of Zamboanga and 
Cebu; they had spent in Japan much of their earnings which 
would have been spent in the Philippines or the United States 
by Filipinos or Americans; they had alienated lands belonging 
to non-Christian tribes; and through their economic power they 
had brought local officials under their influence. 
But as agitation for Philippine independence increased both 
in the Islands and in Washington, Governor General Roosevelt, 
as the highest American official in the Philippines and as a repre-
sentative of the President of the United States, saw one disad-
vantage stand out more vividly than all others. In his belief: 
. . . the situation in Davao presents a potential menace to the security 
of the Islands. That the Japanese are firmly entrenched there, that they 
are extending their influence, that they dominate the hemp and lumber 
business in that region, there is no shadow of doubt. That they are 
planning future expansion with further extension of their control over 
hemp, coconut, timber and cattle land is probable. And finally, that in 
the event of the withdrawal of American sovereignty there will be an im-
mediate and positive advance along all lines there is likewise little doubt. 
The weakness, richness, and proximity of the Islands present altogether 
too lucrative a stake for Japan to ignore, and should American protec-
tion be withdrawn, then Japanese economic exploitation and political 
penetration will at once become a very real threat.83 
What Roosevelt failed to state, however, was that, even if 
everything he had said of the position of the Japanese were true, 
the progress of the Japanese settlement there had occurred in the 
beginning with the encouragement of the Americans and sub-
sequently by virtue of their tolerance. Moreover, Roosevelt him-
self was not only personally strongly opposed to Philippine inde-
pendence and therefore looking for every possible reason to 
bolster a conclusion he had long since reached, but he was also 
the representative in the Islands of an administration in Wash-
ington that was equally opposed to independence and therefore 
perhaps equally eager to magnify the situation in Davao. 
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Despite the somewhat alarmist views of a Theodore Roose-
velt, Jr., howTever, the great potential of Davao was still prac-
tically unexploited. Moreover, since the total acreage of the 
province was over 3,250,000 acres of which nearly 70% was esti-
mated to be arable and since the total population of the province 
was in the neighborhood of 170,000, in realistic numerical terms 
Japanese ' 'penetration" was infinitesimal. Japanese capital, or-
ganization, direction, efficiency, and, above all, hard work had 
certainly begun to scratch the profitable surface of Davao's un-
tapped wealth. Yet there was no apparent reason why Filipinos 
themselves should not do as well or in fact outstrip the aliens in 
their midst. Describing the development of Davao by the Jap-
anese the Herald could justifiably editorialize: 
The story of Japanese prosperity in Davao is the story of the sur-
render of a national heritage, of unpardonable indifference, of shameful 
neglect. In it are reflected the procrastination of our government and 
the apathy of our people. Our generation to come will read in that story 
the dismemberment of their national domain and the barter of their 
rights.84 
For all the investigations of supposed Japanese chicanery at 
Davao were often little more than smokescreens for the failure 
of the Philippine government and the Filipino people to address 
themselves with energy and purpose to the exploitation of their 
own land. No matter how illegally the Japanese had obtained 
land, and indeed in many cases their methods seemed out-
rageously unethical, in the end the clearing of that land and its 
subsequent productivity were the real measures of its value. T o 
achieve these results required plenty of capital and unstinting 
labor. T h e former was copiously supplied by Japanese cor-
porations and banks with the support and sympathetic coopera-
tion of the Japanese government while the latter was provided 
by frugal, disciplined immigrant workers from Japan, men 
whose work habits were exemplary, whose labors were marked 
by a high degree of cooperative effort, whose women shared 
their husbands' hardships, who kept themselves clean, who ate 
simple but nutritious food and were careful of their drinking 
water, and who slept only from 8 or 9 p.m. to 3 or 4 a.m. Thus it 
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was that without sufficient or coordinated government financial 
support or technical assistance and lacking the same psychologi-
cal drive which motivated the Japanese laborer even the Filipino 
homesteader in Davao very quickly left his land and became a 
cargador at the bidding of a Japanese overseer. As one writer 
so aptly stated, "Facing the stiff competition given him by the 
Japanese who are furnished capital and who are by nature better 
farmers and trained in the art of coaxing plants to give greater 
returns, the Filipino homeseeker prefers to sell his interest on 
the land to the Japanese and work for him."85 
Moreover, since the direct acquisition of land by the Jap-
anese was the principal obstacle to the development of the Jap-
anese agricultural stake at Davao, the Japanese became almost 
totally dependent on indirect acquisition by means of the sev-
eral techniques described earlier. And because at almost every 
turn the success of these techniques depended on the goodwill 
of Filipino government officials at the provincial or national 
level, the Japanese perforce evolved a modus operandi with Fili-
pino officialdom which, while admittedly never entirely secure 
and often somewhat costly, nevertheless permitted a continuous 
and substantial expansion in Japanese investments in the Davao 
area. Much of the time of the Japanese consular staff in both 
Manila and Davao seemed to be taken up by both public and 
private arguments with Filipino officials over the legality or 
illegality of this or that specific arrangement for Japanese cul-
tivation of a given tract of land. In reality, however, of far 
greater significance to the security of Japanese interests was the 
extent to which influence could be brought to bear on individual 
officials, on the basis of interpersonal relationships either be-
tween Japanese and Filipinos or between Japanese-employed 
Filipinos and other Filipinos. 
For example, during 1933, reports from the Japanese consu-
late at Davao indicated that pressures which during the preced-
ing year had been directed at subleases to the Japanese under 
the pakiaw system had been markedly relaxed. Davao Acting 
Consul Kaneko attributed this development to the friendly re-
lations which had been maintained between the Davao consulate 
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and local officials of the Bureau of Lands as well as to the similar 
contacts secretly existing between the consulate and provincial 
officials, several of whom were themselves lessors of land to the 
Japanese.86 It was also noted that there had been an apparent 
relaxation in the attitude toward enforcement of land laws on 
the part of the Chief of the Bureau of Lands Serafin Hilado, who 
in the past had been particularly strict in regard to the Japanese 
cultivators at Davao; and in October, 1933, the new Chief of the 
Bureau of Lands, Simeon Ramos, upheld the legality of the 
pakiaw system.87 In some measure this was believed to have 
come about because of the intervention of former Senator Jose 
P. Laurel, principal legal adviser to the Japanese Consulate 
General in Manila, who had told a member of the Davao con-
sular staff that he himself was strongly opposed to any interfer-
ence with the rights of the Japanese to pursue their business ac-
tivities peacefully and that he would do his utmost to protect 
those rights.88 
Typical of the improved situation at Davao, according to 
Consul Kaneko, was the atmosphere at a dinner party tendered 
by local officials to the visiting House of Peers South Seas Inspec-
tion Party from Japan on June 25, 1933. Kaneko reported that 
in attendance at the affair were about one hundred leaders of 
the Davao community—businessmen, lawyers, journalists, plus 
ten or so Americans, and a few Chinese. Besides the Governor 
and several local officials, seven or eight other persons gave wel-
coming speeches, and all commented on the remarkable efforts 
and successes achieved by the Japanese in developing Davao. 
There were even some who said that after independence the 
Philippines must depend on Japan for leadership and protec-
tion. Observed Kaneko happily, "In the last ten years there has 
rarely been such a successful party."89 
Thus, generally speaking, despite certain momentary dis-
ruptions, the path of the Japanese to continued economic ad-
vance in Davao was actually relatively smooth, and the scope of 
that advance was well reflected in statistical data. A report of 
the Bureau of Insular Affairs for the province of Davao for fiscal 
1934 showed the following:90 
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Total population: 
Christian Filipinos - 105,071 
Non-Christian Filipinos 80,125 
Americans - - 150 
Chinese . 2,481 
Japanese 13,85791 
Other Foreigners 342 
Total "20^026"" 
Realty Holdings of Foreigners: 
Area in Hectares Assessed Value 
Japanese 38,774.0366 P9,569,930.00 
Chinese 6,846.0905 2,096,910.00 
Spaniards 6,558.8840 815,400.00 
Detail of Realty Holdings of Japanese: 
(a) Purchases from Government or from Individuals, Land Area— 
6,161.8884 Ha.; Value—P890,690.00. (b) Leases from Government or 
from Individuals, Land Area-32,613.0482 Ha.; Value-P588,290.00. [Im-
provements in abaca, coconut, and fruit tree cultivation, and in plants, 
machinery, and buildings substantially increased these values.] 
Japanese Percentage of Participation in Davao Province Industries: 
25% of Farming 75% of Carpentry 
5% of Copra Drying 70% of Furniture and 
60% of Fishing Cabinet Making 
5% of Cattle Raising 60% of Tinsmithing 
40% of Hemp Stripping 50% of Photographic Studios 
60% of Tajore Making 80% of Refreshment Parlors 
100% of Soft Drinks 50% of Ice Plants 
60% of Odong Manufacturing 100% of Sawmills 
60% of Taoyee 50% of Firewood Industry 
60% of Lumbering 5% of Trucking 
67% of Blacksmithing 23% of Merchants 
50% of Gold and Silver Works 25% of Retail Tobacco Dealers 
15% of Tailoring 32% of Retail Liquor Dealers 
74% of Bicycle Repair Shops 
Total Volume of Business Transacted in Davao Province, 
1930-34: P59,179,321.97 
Total Volume of Business Transacted by 
Japanese Individuals, 1930-34: P12,793,966.38 
Total Volume of Business Transacted by 
Japanese Corporations, 1930-34: P10,162,916.93 
Clearly the major enterprise of the Japanese settlement in 
Davao was the raising of abaca for the making of hemp. By 1934, 
80% of the abaca grown in Davao was being produced by the 
Japanese for a total annual production of 500,000 bales of 
hemp.92 So efficient were the methods of cultivation employed 
by the Japanese that an amount of land equivalent to that util-
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ized for the Japanese 80% was required to grow the remaining 
20% of the provincial abaca production. In addition to export-
ing to Japan better than 9 5 % of the total hemp produced at 
Davao, the Japanese also sent to Japan for industrial use (paper 
pulp, coarse rope, etc.) practically all of the "Grade W " (mean-
ing waste) or abaca scrap which ordinarily was either discarded 
or used in the making of door mats. One further significance of 
Japan's control of the Philippine hemp industry was that the 
hemp trade did not depend on a protected market as did sugar 
or coconut oil. Thus, the impending termination of free trade 
with the United States with the coming of independence would 
not affect hemp, which had no need of any artificial protection. 
It was, therefore, probably as much alien control of a key sector 
of the Philippine economy as it was suspected illegal acquisition 
of land that caused a series of charges against the Japanese in 
Davao to be aired and publicly debated beginning with the 
Constitutional Convention in 1934. 
The Philippine Constitutional Convention and Davao 
In a message dispatched to Foreign Minister Hirota Koki on 
July 26, 1934, Acting Davao Consul Kaneko had warned his 
superiors in Tokyo that there was a possibility that the Conven-
tion might make decisions unfavorable to the Japanese in such 
vital areas as naturalization, immigration, and landholding. 
Under the provisions for Philippine independence in the Tyd-
ings-McDuffie Act, the President of the United States had to 
approve the Philippine Constitution before the ten-year transi-
tion period to independence could be inaugurated. Therefore, 
the Japanese were particularly fearful lest the Filipinos, in order 
to further the likelihood of swift American approval of their 
Constitution, include in it articles designed to pander to Ameri-
can apprehensions about the Japanese interests in the Islands. 
Kaneko reported that he had already had a conversation 
about these matters with Davao Delegate Rafael A. Castillo who, 
according to Kaneko, was a friend of the Japanese and who had 
agreed to work against any anti-Japanese proposals. Kaneko 
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urged Castillo to get in touch with former Senator Laurel and 
former Representative Lorenzo, attorneys in the employ of the 
Japanese, who were friends of Japan and who would assist Cas-
tillo. The Davao Acting Consul also warned the Foreign Office 
that the Convention delegates most likely to cause trouble were 
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, Miguel Cuaderno, and Salvador 
Araneta.93 
However, the principal speech at the Convention on the sub-
ject of Japanese interests was not made by any of these men but 
by another delegate from Davao, Pantaleon Pelayo, who asserted 
that members of the legislature, constabulary officers and various 
government officials were involved in a profitable system of leas-
ing public lands which in return for a share of the profits they 
would then sublease to the Japanese. Pelayo claimed that with 
the aid of such Filipino dummies, Japanese controlled 90% of 
the land in Davao Province, which he said was the richest 
province in the Islands. According to Pelayo: 
Japanese interests in Mindanao have great influence upon the people 
there, especially those in the Government, especially the higher-ups in 
Mindanao, especially in Davao. To the lawyers, the Japanese are the 
best clients; to the doctors, they are the best patients; to the public offi-
cials, they are the best friends, especially when Christmas time comes.94 
Pelayo also claimed that the Japanese were smuggling arms and 
ammunition into Davao, that they were fostering the illegal 
entry of immigrants into the region, and that, as a solution to 
both of these problems, the port of Davao should be closed. 
Although ultimately the issue of alien landholding was 
dealt with in the Constitution only through the inclusion of 
Article XII,95 the charges leveled by Pelayo caused repercus-
sions throughout the Islands; and the press, in particular, took 
up the issues that had been raised by Pelayo's speech. Once 
more public attention was focused on Davao, and the Japanese 
found themselves again on the defensive and seeking appropriate 
countermeasures. However, previous investigations of the Jap-
anese in Davao by both the executive and legislative branches 
of the Philippine government; an increasing tendency toward 
an anti-alien Philippine nationalism, which had accompanied 
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the growth of independence fervor; and an increase among both 
politicians and journalists of anti-Japanese propaganda since 
the Manchurian Incident certainly had kept both the local Jap-
anese consular staff and the leaders of the local Japanese com-
munity on the qui vive. What seemed to have surprised the Jap-
anese was that Pelayo should be the source of this renewed as-
sault on their settlement at Davao, and what particularly con-
cerned them was the response which his accusations seemed to 
arouse. 
Nevertheless, with impressive speed Acting Consul Kaneko 
provided the Foreign Office with a candid and revealing analysis 
of Delegate Pelayo, and of the apparent motivations for his out-
burst.96 Pelayo, born in 1901 and graduated from law school in 
1925, after passing the bar examination moved from Manila to 
Davao in 1926. Several years later he purchased sixty hectares 
of land in the Guianga region of Davao Province and hired seven 
or eight Japanese to cultivate hemp on his property. He also 
became, in his wife's name, the local agent of Heacock Company 
and of the Free Press. Although Pelayo had begun to participate 
in local politics almost from the time of his arrival in Davao, he 
had been largely overlooked by the Davao political elite because 
of his relative youth. However, in the summer of 1933, in the 
fight over the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act,97 he gained a certain 
notoriety by teaming up with veteran Davao politicians Celes-
tiano Chavez and Rafael Castillo in support of Quezon and the 
Antis and in the general election of that year by backing the 
former Governor S. T . Generoso, who was victorious over the 
incumbent Governor Juan Sarenas. It was in that same election 
that Pelayo himself was elected to be one of Davao's two delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention. Consul Kaneko noted that 
throughout his prior political career Pelayo had evidenced "arro-
gant and eccentric'' conduct and wrote that some of Pelayo's 
own supporters were concerned about his "irrational behavior/ ' 
Because of the broad character of Japanese interests in 
Davao, it was of course necessary for the Japanese to have the 
best possible local legal representation, and not unexpectedly 
the leading Davao attorneys whom the Japanese hired were also 
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prominent in local politics. For example, among the aforemen-
tioned politicos, Castillo, who was Pelayo's political ally and 
fellow delegate to the Constitutional Convention, had for years 
been an invaluable legal adviser to the Ohta Development Com-
pany as well as to other Japanese firms in Davao, and Sarenas 
had had a similar association with the Furukawa Plantation 
Company and two or three more Japanese enterprises. But, 
since Castillo and Sarenas were themselves bitter personal rivals, 
their opposition to one another, as in the recent gubernatorial 
campaign, inevitably involved the Japanese in controversies 
which were hardly of their own making. For it was widely ru-
mored during the 1933 election that both the Generoso and the 
Sarenas groups were being assisted by the Japanese; and the 
Generoso supporters, in particular, joined of course by Pelayo, 
attacked Sarenas as being an appointed official of several Jap-
anese companies in order to enhance his personal fortune. How-
ever, in reporting this information, Consul Kaneko who was 
extremely sensitive to the ways of Philippine politics, com-
mented that these accusations were only campaign propaganda 
and had no malicious intent against the Japanese since Castillo, 
for example, bore the same kind of relationship as Sarenas to a 
number of Japanese firms, and Pelayo himself used Japanese to 
farm his land. 
In examining Pelayo's reasoning in making his inflammatory 
speech, Consul Kaneko first pointed out to the Foreign Office the 
fact that the whole atmosphere which surrounded the Constitu-
tional Convention unfortunately had a pronounced anti-Jap-
anese cast. According to Kaneko, this atmosphere was the result 
of increasing concern on the part of many Filipinos about the 
whole range of relations with an apparently aggressive, expand-
ing Japan at a time when Philippine independence was impend-
ing. Kaneko also placed some of the blame for the advocating of 
measures to curb Japanese economic activities and Japanese 
colonization on Filipino sugar and coconut growers. These lat-
ter groups, he said, in cooperation with certain government 
officials and American businessmen in the Islands, were attempt-
ing to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment in order to protect their 
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own interests by supporting the continuation of free trade with 
the United States. As far as Pelayo himself was concerned, Ka-
neko opined that ever since his arrival in Manila, Pelayo had 
been questioned by his fellow delegates to the Convention about 
the Davao problem; and being placed in the anti-Japanese atmos-
phere of the Convention and desiring to be in the limelight, 
Pelayo had attempted to distinguish himself as a ' 'patriot" by 
making his much discussed speech. Kaneko also thought that it 
was worthy of note that Pelayo had made his remarks at a time 
when his colleague Castillo had gone home on business. 
For, in brief, Kaneko believed, and Castillo in a subsequent 
chat agreed with him, that Pelayo had hoped to use the Conven-
tion floor to direct the same kind of attack against his provincial 
political rivals led by Sarenas as had been made during the pre-
vious year's campaign and, in so doing, to focus attention on 
himself as the probable future political kingpin of Davao 
Province. However, given the prevailing climate of opinion at 
the Constitutional Convention, Pelayo's accusations against the 
Japanese (read Sarenas et al.), which in this instance went beyond 
the bounds that usually surrounded the political charges and 
countercharges at the provincial level, produced nationwide re-
percussions. And, while Manila opinion as reflected, for ex-
ample, in the press and in the magazines seemed to take up 
Pelayo's statements with enthusiasm and gave them wide circu-
lation, in Davao, according to Consul Kaneko, those who knew 
Pelayo tended to laugh at him for repeating such an "old story" 
as though it were his own discovery. The opposing Sarenas 
faction called Pelayo a "hypocrite" and derided Generoso and 
Castillo for having suported such a character for national office. 
Moreover, Kaneko reported that Castillo, who himself had many 
associations with the Japanese, was greatly angered by Pelayo's 
"grandstand play" and tried very had to make amends to the 
Japanese Consul. 
As far as the charges made in Pelayo's speech were concerned, 
Consul Kaneko assured the Foreign Office that they were "false," 
"groundless," and in fact "childish." Of the 44 Japanese firms 
operating in Davao all but three had legally bought or leased 
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public land under land laws enacted prior to 1919, or had ac-
quired privately owned land. The remaining three companies, 
Kaneko continued, were organized under the land law then in 
force, and 6 1 % of the stock in those firms was held by either 
Americans or Filipinos (including Sarenas) as the law required. 
The only problem then was the method by which the Japanese 
farmed leased land, the crop or labor contract-work principle of 
4 'obtaining a set percentage of the crop in recompense for the 
labor offered for a set period of time" (pakiaw system). How-
ever, since the Bureau of Lands had decided the preceding Oc-
tober that that system was in no way an infraction of the law, 
unless some as yet unforeseen new regulations were imposed, 
any interference with the pakiaw system seemed quite unlikely 
to Kaneko. 
Consul Kaneko also dismissed the additional allegations of 
Pelayo that the Japanese were smuggling arms and ammunition 
into Davao as another "old story," which had been fostered in 
the past by reckless and ambitious politicians or by certain un-
scrupulous local officials who used such charges to obtain funds 
from the national government in Manila for supposed "on-the-
spot investigations." Moreover, Kaneko related that, when on 
the 10th of October he had discussed Pelayo's speech with a 
group of Filipino dinner guests including one Major Ramos of 
the Mindanao district headquarters of the Philippine Constabu-
lary, the Consul had asked, "Major Ramos, because of your duty 
and responsibility you must certainly know whether or not this 
talk [of the Japanese being involved in the smuggling of arms 
and ammunition] has any basis in fact. What is the real situa-
tion?" T o this question, according to Kaneko, Major Ramos 
had replied, "There is no evidence at all of such smuggling." 
Finally, in response to the accusation of Pelayo that the Jap-
anese were entering Davao illegally, Kaneko commented that in-
deed during the earlier hemp boom some seamen had deserted 
their ships and a few crewmen from fishing boats had entered 
Davao without proper authorization. However, he estimated 
that no more than two hundred such persons remained. Other-
wise there was no reason for any Japanese to attempt illegal entry 
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since there was no legal restriction against their coming to the 
Philippines. Therefore, reported Kaneko, since Japanese en-
trants were all coming in under proper procedures, this state-
ment of Pelayo's like the others, was "entirely groundless." 
However, despite what seemed to him to be the obvious 
fallaciousness of Pelayo's "vicious propaganda," Consul Kaneko 
was wise enough to recognize that the so-called Japanese problem 
had become a focal point of nationwide attention in the Philip-
pines. Accordingly, he prepared for the Foreign Office a memo-
randum in which he discussed possible countermeasures which 
he believed might appropriately be considered.98 Generally 
speaking, Kaneko wrote, there were two possibilities for dealing 
with this kind of accusatory attack. One was to pass over it in 
silence and to let the matter run its natural course, and the 
other was for the Japanese to intensify their efforts to "en-
lighten" the Filipinos. Kaneko admitted that the first alternative 
was attractive, taking into consideration the Filipino character. 
He also noted that in the past many problems which at first 
seemed to have aroused a great to-do were, when left alone, ap-
parently forgotten. However, in this instance Consul Kaneko 
concluded that the second course was more advisable, and he 
proceeded to prescribe countermeasures which he believed 
should be taken in order to "enlighten" the Filipino public. 
First of all, he proposed that well-known Filipino newspaper-
men from Manila be invited to Davao in order to try to provide 
the national press with a more accurate understanding, from the 
Japanese point of view, of the position of the Japanese in Davao. 
He hoped the Foreign Office would subscribe 1,500 pesos in 
order to pay the fares and expenses for such individuals. Next 
Kaneko recommended the printing and distribution of a "pam-
phlet" which would explain the Davao story from the Japanese 
point of view, and he also requested 500 pesos for the printing 
cost of such a brochure. Thirdly, he suggested the establish-
ment of a Japan-Philippines Society to be patterned after the 
Japan Society in the United States and to carry out a program 
similar to that of the Japan Society. He noted that while such an 
association had been in the offing for a year or two, to date it had 
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not materialized; but now that tourist parties of distinguished 
local residents were being sent to Japan, they might well be the 
nucleus of the society under discussion. Fourthly, Kaneko wrote 
that he himself intended to go to Manila and talk with news-
papermen and influential politicians to clarify the real situation 
of the Japanese in Davao and to rectify misunderstandings. 
Finally, he urged that the attention of the Governor General, 
the Secretary of the Interior, and the Commander of the Con-
stabulary be called to the necessity of checking those who spread 
vicious propaganda, particularly the rumors about the smug-
gling of weapons and ammunition, which might impede the 
friendly relations which then existed between Japan and the 
Philippines. 
Consul Kaneko also stated that, since the Constitutional 
Convention was then taking up a number of proposals which 
affected the Japanese and was to enter its period of crucial 
decision-making in the latter part of November and the early 
part of December, it was important to expedite these matters as 
much as possible. Therefore, the Davao Acting Consul re-
quested permission from the Foreign Minister to make an official 
trip to Manila for this purpose and said he would need 250 pesos 
as minimum expenses. 
Secretary Rodriguez Enters the Picture 
That Consul Kaneko's proposals were extremely timely was 
very evident when Eulogio Rodriguez, who had been appointed 
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 24, 1934, 
followed up the speech of Pelayo and the furor which it had 
occasioned by sending to investigate conditions in Davao in 
December, 1934, his brother Representative Julian Rodriguez, 
who had been elected to the Lower House from Davao. Further, 
on January 4, 1935, the Herald reported that at its next regular 
session the Philippine Legislature would discuss three plans to 
solve the "Japanese problem'' in Davao. Two proposals to be 
offered for consideration to the House of Representatives by 
Representative Jose T . Surtida, Chairman of the Committee on 
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Public Lands, were to purchase all lands and properties of the 
Japanese at Davao for P20,000,000 and to prohibit foreign 
laborers from working on public lands under lease. Secretary 
Rodriguez's brother, the aforementioned Representative Julian 
Rodriguez, said he would urge the rigid enforcement of the pro-
visions of the acts governing public lands which prohibited the 
possession of public lands by foreigners other than Americans. 
And in response to the first recommendation of Representative 
Surtida, Consul General Kimura, in order to reinforce his public 
contention that the Japanese were in Davao only for economic 
reasons, said that a reasonable offer would be given sympathetic 
consideration." 
On January 7, 1935, Secretary Rodriguez sent to Davao a 
six-man committee of officials of his department under the chair-
manship of Attorney Alfredo Fajardo of the Bureau of Lands. 
This group was instructed to obtain specific data about the ex-
tent and nature of the Japanese holdings there and to make 
recommendations accordingly. Then, during the first ten days 
of February, Secretary Rodriguez himself, accompanied by a 
party of fifteen persons, including the Undersecretary of Justice, 
the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, Senator Nolasco, and Gov-
ernor Sevilla of Rizal Province, traveled to Davao in order to 
make a study at first hand of the role of the Japanese in the 
region. Stopping off at Zamboanga en route to Davao, the Secre-
tary made public a plan to purchase all Japanese land holdings 
in Davao for the same amount, P20,000,000, which had been 
mentioned in the proposal of Representative Surtida. Such a 
move, said Rodriguez, would be the most "efficacious and expedi-
tious' ' way of solving the whole Davao land question, and he be-
lieved that the Japanese, as stated previously by Consul General 
Kimura, would be agreeable. The Secretary recommended pay-
ment be made on a long term annual installment basis with the 
funds to be derived from the proceeds of the American process-
ing tax, which, it had already been agreed, would be returned 
to the Philippines.100 
On his arrival at Davao, Secretary Rodriguez held a series of 
discussions with provincial officials, prominent business figures, 
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and leaders of the foreign community, including Consul Kaneko. 
Not unexpectedly, Kaneko told Rodriguez that the Japanese 
in Davao came there simply to make an honest living, that they 
had no ulterior motives, and that they did not intend to stay per-
manently in the province. Kaneko estimated the Japanese popu-
lation in Davao at about 13,000 and claimed Japanese invest-
ments in the province to be worth between 40 and 50 million 
pesos. He also said that some 40,000 Filipinos were given em-
ployment by virtue of those investments.101 The most curious 
statement made by the Japanese official was that 4,000 Japanese 
had lost their lives pioneering in Davao and that 2,000 of those 
had been killed by wild tribesmen!102 Actually, according to con-
stabulary records, between 1907 and 1934, 54 Japanese had been 
killed in Mindanao, 27 of those within the years since 1921.103 
As one writer put it, 
This is unfortunate, but at least it is not so bad as the alleged "2,000." 
Two thousand killed would indicate a minor war, and a war the govern-
ment, at least, knows nothing about! If there were two thousand Japanese 
killed, how many lost their lives on the other side? Alas! As to this we 
are also in the dark!104 
Perhaps more unexpected than the remarks of the Japanese 
consul was the reaction to Rodriguez's investigation on the part 
of the Filipinos at Davao. They were extremely uncooperative 
and consistently withheld information. When Secretary Rodri-
guez asked for suggestions to facilitate the preservation of public 
lands for Filipino use and to assist in the exclusion of aliens, 
only one person spoke out on the dummy problem, but so strong 
was Japanese influence that all of his fellow citizens joined in 
unanimous condemnation of him.105 
However, by February 9, when the Rodriguez party left 
Davao, the Philippine press reported that the Secretary and 
Consul Kaneko had reached an agreement to "settle the Davao 
problem permanently. , ,1()6 As a preliminary step in that direc-
tion, Kaneko had proposed the calling of a round-table confer-
ence in Manila to include, in addition to all of the officials 
concerned, both Japanese and Filipino owners and officials of 
Japanese corporations and enterprises in Davao. With regard 
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to the possible result of the first-hand inspection of Davao by 
Rodriguez himself, Consul Kaneko told the press, "I hope Secre-
tary Rodriguez will hand down a fair decision. I admire his 
frankness in approaching a solution to the Davao question.,,1()7 
Moreover, Morokuma Yasaku, president and manager of the 
Ohta Development Company, traveled to Manila with Secretary 
Rodriguez aboard the government cutter Bustamente. Moro-
kuma stated that in his view he could not see any reason for the 
proposed purchase of the Japanese holdings in Davao and 
thought that such a development could only be to the detriment 
of the economic prosperity of the area. Nevertheless, if the price 
were "reasonable/' he said that he favored the sale because the 
Japanese could reinvest in Borneo. Added Morokuma: 
[t is unfair to accuse us of territorial designs. We are not a menace to 
the Philippines. We do not covet the Philippines. The Japanese govern-
ment is not intervening and is not interested in any conflict.108 
Of particular concern to the outcome of Secretary Rodri-
guez's inspection mission and of special importance to the Jap-
anese was the attitude of Rodriguez himself. On this question 
there seemed to be some difference in the interpretations of 
Davao Consul Kaneko and Consul General Kimura. For Kaneko 
reported from Davao that while the Secretary was in that com-
munity between February 7 and February 9, his attitude was to 
try to maintain the status quo and to try to obstruct any further 
expansion of Japanese interests in the region. Such views, Ka-
neko believed, were evidenced by Rodriguez's public statements 
as well as by his having asked Kaneko himself at a private dinner 
party what the Japanese would do if lands which they had sub-
leased were confiscated.109 Consul General Kimura, however, 
told the Foreign Office that he had paid a call on Acting Gov-
ernor General Hayden, who had assured Kimura that before 
Rodriguez's departure for Davao, the Secretary had assured Hay-
den of his impartiality and denied any intention of threatening 
the position of the Japanese. Moreover, Kimura was disturbed 
lest the seeming belligerence of Kaneko toward the Rodriguez 
visit, as reported by the press, prejudice not only public opinion 
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toward the Japanese but also Secretary Rodriguez, whom Ki-
mura believed to be "sympathetic/'110 
When Rodriguez returned to Manila on February 14, after 
a conference with Acting Governor General Hayden, the Secre-
tary said that there seemed to be four possible solutions to the 
Davao problem: 
1. Unconditional cancellation of illegally leased public 
lands. 
2. Dissolution of subleasing with compensation for 
losses. 
3. Legalization of subleases. 
4. Cancellation of subleasing and permitting direct 
leases by Japanese.111 
That the first of these four proposals was the one which was 
attracting the most interest within the Philippine government 
became increasingly evident during the next few days. On 
February 19, Consul General Kimura reported to Tokyo that at 
a party he had attended he had been informed that it had vir-
tually been decided that officials who had taken advantage of 
their official position to lease land from the government and 
sublease it to others would be officially disciplined by having 
their original leases cancelled. However, in such cases it was 
said that the government would take the place of the lessor, 
would become the party to the contract, and would protect the 
rights and interests of those persons, i.e., Japanese, who were 
now farming such lands. Further, it was hoped that since such 
cancellations would be directed at the Filipino officials involved, 
the Japanese cultivators would exercise prudence and would 
remain calm so as not to create any unpleasantness between the 
two countries.112 
At the same time Davao Consul Kaneko who was in Manila 
to further his "enlightenment" program met with Secretary 
Rodriguez. The latter told Kaneko that as a result of his in-
vestigation he intended to take drastic action in only a few cases 
of land held in the names of government officials. Rodriguez also 
said that he intended to recommend to Senate President Quezon 
and Acting Governor General Hayden that Japanese investments 
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in such properties be fully protected and that in the forthcom-
ing legislative session he would introduce a bill which would 
legally protect the vested interests of aliens on public lands. 
Moreover, Rodriguez indicated that he was most eager to avoid 
any clamorous controversy, for which Kaneko expressed his ap-
preciation.113 Accordingly, both Kimura and Kaneko agreed in 
their report to the Foreign Office that, as a result of the current 
investigations, some Filipinos would lose their lands and there 
would undoubtedly be a considerable degree of turmoil. How-
ever, it was stressed that from the Japanese point of view it was 
unlikely that there would be any substantial loss.114 
On February 19, Secretary Rodriguez made public the report 
of his personal investigation of the Davao problem.115 Among 
his conclusions was the statement that the Japanese now con-
trolled 59,998.8659 hectares of land in Davao Province. Al-
though there were 1,929,724 hectares, including mountains and 
forests, in the province, according to Rodriguez, the Japanese 
lands constituted two-thirds of the whole cultivated area and en-
compassed the choicest agricultural lands. T h e report also 
stated that while the Japanese had not acquired any land by 
violence and had made real contributions to the economy of 
Davao, nevertheless under Philippine laws leases and subleases of 
public lands to Japanese by Filipinos were illegal and would have 
to be dealt with accordingly.116 As of December 31, 1934, Secre-
tary Rodriguez estimated that there were 13,857 Japanese in 
Davao. His somewhat inflammatory conclusion was, therefore, 
that Davao was a rich province in the hands of the Japanese. 
T o meet the situation which had been "uncovered/' the fol-
lowing remedies were proposed: 
1. Immediately to suspend temporarily any action re-
garding public land concessions in Davao, Cotabato, 
Zamboanga, Sulu, and Lanao until the best method 
of the disposal of these lands could be found. 
2. T o exercise closer supervision over the issuance of 
pasture permits by the Bureau of Forestry and pro-
visional permits for pasture purposes by the Bureau 
of Lands. 
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3. T o direct cadastral parties to go to Davao, Cotabato, 
Zamboanga, Sulu, and Lanao to subdivide public 
lands therein into small parcels which would be made 
available only to qualified applicants. 
4. T o cancel immediately or reject applications from 
government officials who were guilty of leasing or sub-
leasing to Japanese or other aliens. 
5. T o cancel other illegal leases or subleases after a gen-
eral study of all the contracts entered into had been 
undertaken. 
6. T o have the government plan a definite policy of not 
renewing land leases under Acts 2921 and 2975 when 
they expire.117 
7. T o require all notaries public to submit to the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and Commerce a copy of all con-
tracts executed by them affecting any lands in which 
the parties involved were aliens. 
Having issued his report, the Secretary of Agriculture and 
Commerce proceeded to take measures to implement his plans 
to solve the Davao land problem. On March 7, with the purpose 
of preventing further violations of public land laws, Rodriguez 
promulgated two administrative orders. One of the orders pro-
vided for the sending of survey parties to make cadastral surveys 
of three districts of Davao where aliens resided. The purpose of 
this action was to try to delimit alien landholdings and to set 
aside all available remaining land for homesteaders. T h e second 
administrative decree set down a new code of rules governing 
the approval of applications for the granting of public lands and 
instructed the Director of the Bureau of Lands to hold up action 
on all pending applications or those which had been previously 
rejected until the cadastral surveys could be completed. Secre-
tary Rodriguez also ordered the transfer of the best public lands 
officials of the Bureau of Lands to the provinces of Agusan, Cota-
bato, and Davao to enforce land laws properly.118 Moreover, in 
an exchange of letters the contents of which were made public, 
Acting Governor General Hayden and Secretary Rodriguez indi-
cated their general agreement on Rodriguez's plans "to enforce 
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public law and to retain the public patrimony for future genera-
tions/'119 And on April 8, Hay den, in order to give the full 
support of his office for the Secretary's actions, revoked executive 
proclamation No. 67, s.1920, which had opened public lands in 
Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Lanao, and Zamboanga for dis-
position subject to future classification.120 
Japanese Countermoves 
Since the Japanese consular staff in the Islands as well as the 
local Japanese community had had every indication of the prob-
able tenor of Rodriguez's report and of the possible actions that 
would follow its issuance, they were hardly unprepared for it. In 
fact, in line with the countermeasures that had been recom-
mended by Consul Kaneko at the time of the Pelayo speech, a 
number of countermoves were already in progress. For example, 
under the aegis of Kaneko a "Davao Goodwill Tourist Party" 
had been organized for a trip to Japan. The party was described 
by the Davao Consul as consisting of relatively influential offi-
cials and private citizens of Davao, all of whom were said to be 
upper-class and members of the local intelligentsia.121 The tour 
leader was to be Antonio Habana, Jr., a former Assistant Provin-
cial Fiscal and a law partner of Attorney Romualdo C. Quimpo, 
who was himself both a consulting lawyer of the Japanese Con-
sulate in Davao and a local political leader. Significantly 
Habana's travel expenses were being donated by the Davao 
Japanese Cultivators Association and the Japanese Association of 
Davao.122 
In his report to the Foreign Office on this proposed trip to 
Japan by Davao community leaders, Kaneko noted that the ma-
jority of the Filipinos living in Davao had contact, whether 
direct or indirect, with the economic or colonization activities 
of the local Japanese; and he felt that perhaps with only one or 
two exceptions, those Filipinos were pro-Japanese. However, 
according to Kaneko, if there were any narrow-mindedness or 
self-righteousness toward the Japanese among the local populace 
at Davao, it was his opinion that such misunderstandings re-
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suited from their seeing what often appeared to be the ' low 
grade life" led by immigrant colonists in the area. 
Therefore, the Consul urged that the opportunity of the 
sightseeing party's coming to Japan be utilized to "deepen their 
understanding of Japanese culture and industry.'' He recom-
mended they be provided with a guide by the Japan Tourist 
Bureau and that they be shown industrial installations, especially 
in the Tokyo and Osaka regions, military and naval facilities, 
schools, etc. Kaneko also asked that the party meet representa-
tives of parent companies or related companies of Japanese en-
terprises which were operating in Davao, and he noted that Ohta 
Development Company, Furukawa Plantation Company, Mitsui 
Bussan, and Osaka Boeki had already agreed to make such ar-
rangements. This kind of trip, concluded the Davao Consul, 
could be very helpful to the Japanese in the so-called Davao 
problem; and, since this was the first such trip from the area, he 
desired the "most striking results."123 
Another of Consul Kaneko's proposed countermeasures had 
been to invite influential newspapermen from Manila to Davao 
to "make them understand the real situation," and hopefully 
to counteract the "detrimental propaganda" about the Japanese 
which was then current in most of the Philippine press.124 When 
the plan received the approval of the Foreign Office, Kaneko 
consulted with the local Japanese entrepreneurs in Davao to 
sound out their reactions. While in general their feeling was 
that it might be a good idea, they felt that it would be wiser to 
watch the developing situation for a period of time before acting 
on this suggestion. Their reasoning was based on the fear that 
unfavorable reports might be published by such visiting news-
men since, in their view, "Filipinos generally cannot be 
trusted."125 The Consul was obviously disgusted with the "stub-
bornly conservative" and negative policy of the business leaders, 
who, he believed, had lost ground in the past by what he termed 
their policy of "temporizing."126 
Kaneko's own opinion was that it would be much wiser to 
move at once to take the initiative and to invite carefully selected 
reporters to Davao in an inconspicuous manner. Moreover, he 
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urged that simultaneously the consulate's consulting attorneys 
and other Filipinos who were close to the Japanese should 
maneuver in an appropriate fashion so that their influence might 
be brought to bear on whatever newspapermen might make the 
trip. It was Kaneko's belief that if the reporters' visits were 
carried out in that way, not only was there nothing to be worried 
about, but favorable results might be surely anticipated. So, on 
March 26, Kaneko reported to Tokyo that as the first experi-
ment under the plan, it was decided to invite to Davao Modesto 
Farolan of the Herald. However, in consideration of the views 
of the Japanese business leaders in Davao, Farolan's visit was to 
be depicted to the public as one made on the initiative of the 
Herald. The Consulate General in Manila was to advance to 
Farolan on his departure for Davao 200 pesos for traveling ex-
penses. Another 200 was to be given to him on his arrival as a 
fee for an advertisement in a special "Davao Supplement" of the 
Herald.121 
The actual visit of Modesto Farolan to Davao came the fol-
lowing month when, accompanied by his son and a secretary, he 
stayed in Davao from April 28 until May 9. During his sojourn 
he was the guest of one of his relatives, a man named Narciso, 
who was Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the local customs 
office. Farolan's trip was reported on in detail by Consul 
Kaneko to the Foreign Office, and as an insight into the inner 
workings of one aspect of Kaneko's "enlightenment" program, 
the account is most revealing.128 
On the evening of his arrival in Davao, April 28, Farolan 
and Narciso were guests of Consul Kaneko at a small dinner 
party at which the president of the Japanese Association of 
Davao was also present. Farolan appeared to Kaneko to be afraid 
of publicity, and asked the Consul for only the usual con-
veniences during his visit and for help with publishing the 
Davao supplement. Farolan also suggested the 30th as the date 
of his next meeting with Kaneko, who gladly agreed, and at the 
same time invited Farolan to the evening reception on the night 
of the 29th in honor of the Emperor's birthday. 
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Farolan's visit to the consulate on the morning of the 30th 
began with his complimenting Kaneko on the party of the night 
before, attended by some five hundred Japanese, Filipino, 
American, British, and Chinese nationals, and which, according 
to Farolan, was unprecedented even in Manila. Moreover, Faro-
Ian commented that he was surprised at the tremendous in-
fluence of the Japanese. Then, in so far as his own trip was 
concerned, he said that his purpose was justly and fairly to ob-
serve at first hand the so-called Davao Japanese problem from 
every angle and to report the results of his observations to 
the public through the press. He hoped that in so doing 
both the officials and the general citizenry might know the 
truth and that to this end he desired the assistance of the 
Davao Consulate. Concretely speaking, Farolan proposed to 
publish his findings in the D-M-H-M129 newspapers in three 
languages (English, Spanish and Tagalog) in a special 28-
or 32-page tabloid-style "Davao Supplement. , , Accordingly, 
he requested the assistance of Kaneko in securing sufficient 
advertising from Japanese firms in Davao to fill every other 
page with advertisements alone, in other words fourteen or 
sixteen full pages of advertising depending on the ultimate 
overall length of the supplement. The fees, he said, would be 
at the reduced rate of 90 pesos for one page or 1,440 pesos for 
the sixteen pages and 4,320 pesos for the publication of the 32-
page supplement in the three languages or a slightly lower 
amount at the same 90-peso-per-page rate for the fourteen pages 
of advertising in the three languages. 
While Kaneko thanked Farolan very kindly for his intention 
to report his findings objectively, the Consul immediately de-
cided that Farolan had really come to Davao to put the financial 
squeeze on the Japanese. Kaneko was very greatly surprised by 
the extent of what seemed to him to be almost extortionate de-
mands to subsidize the publication of the proposed supplement. 
Of course, he was particularly disturbed because the specific plan 
for the invitations and the financing of newspaper reporters to 
come to Davao had been originally his; and, although Consul 
General Kimura had told him that Farolan was interested in 
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some help in obtaining advertising, he had never imagined any-
thing as grandiose as what Farolan had requested. 
Therefore, in regard to Farolan's subsidized supplement 
proposition, Consul Kaneko told the Manila journalist that such 
an expenditure would be impossible for the Japanese at a time 
when there had been a disastrous decline in the price of hemp 
but that the Consul would consult with key business leaders in 
Davao and do his best to secure their support within the maxi-
mum possible limitations. Subsequently, Kaneko explained 
Farolan's desire to the leaders of the local Cultivators Association 
and of the Japanese Association and to other leading Japanese 
commercial and industrial personalities in Davao. They decided 
that they would collectively provide Farolan with a subsidy of 
600 pesos for "traveling expenses" with no obligation insofar as 
the publication of the results of his trip was concerned. And, if 
it were absolutely unavoidable, they would agree to the publica-
tion of a 30-page supplement on Davao in the English-language 
Herald only and would buy advertising in it. 
When Farolan heard about the subsidy offer, he rejected it 
on the grounds that it was likely to cause misunderstanding and 
that it would not help him to fulfill his duty to the D-M-H-M 
newspapers. T h e ' 'unavoidable'' offer was then made, accepted 
by Farolan, and reaffirmed on May 3, at a dinner given by Kane-
ko, at which all of the business leaders involved were present. At 
the time of his departure Farolan was given by the Davao Consul 
a total of 1,400 pesos, including 500 pesos jointly subscribed by 
the Cultivators Association and the Japanese Association. This 
sum was to subsidize both Farolan's personal travel expenses and 
the advertising charges for the English-language Davao supple-
ment in the Herald. Kaneko felt that, all things considered, this 
kind of an expenditure in behalf of an ' 'enlightening" project 
was well worth the money. He noted that Farolan himself was 
most grateful for the assistance and cooperation of the Japanese 
and seemed to be very much satisfied. 
At the conclusion of his stay in Davao, Farolan also made 
known some of his conclusions in a private talk with Kaneko. 
The focus of the so-called Japanese problem in Davao, he said, 
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was certainly the land problem and more specifically the labor 
or crop contract pakiaw system, which was in fact a form of sub-
lease. Farolan personally thought that it would be a wise policy 
for the Philippine government not to tamper with the land ques-
tion and to maintain the status quo. However, he believed that, 
since the government had undertaken such a large-scale investi-
gation of the land situation, it was probably inevitable that in a 
few of the most flagrant cases of land-law violation, land might 
be confiscated, e.g., absentee landholders leasing land outright 
to the Japanese without any investment at all of their own. And 
he recommended that if this happened, the Japanese would be 
well advised not to fight the government's action but rather to 
trust the overall good intentions toward the Japanese of the 
Philippine government and to let the situation develop quietly. 
The implication of his remarks was that after a few initial 
dramatic steps in the most conspicuous cases, the whole matter 
would die a natural death. Farolan further assured Kaneko that 
the Philippine government was well aware that extreme solu-
tions could only generate unpleasant problems abroad and 
serious complications at home. 
Moreover, Farolan told the Davao Consul that he had found 
the various popular rumors about the Japanese, such as illegal 
entry of immigrants, smuggling of arms and ammunition, and 
fortification of strategic locations, to be utterly groundless and 
that he would so state in his article. He also said that he hoped 
the Davao supplement with his report as the core would be pub-
lished by the end of May. This would provide sufficient time, 
he felt, to encourage the development in administration circles 
of opinion favorable to the Japanese before the return from 
Washington to Manila of Governor General Frank Murphy and 
Senate President Quezon, who would undoubtedly want to ex-
amine the whole question of the policy which should be adopted 
toward the Japanese in Davao. Farolan also told Kaneko that 
the Japanese could feel free to reprint the supplement and make 
use of it however they wished.130 
As a matter of fact, the results of Farolan's on-the-scene "in-
dependent survey'' of the Japanese in Davao as ultimately pub-
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lished in the Herald's special supplement were so overwhelm-
ingly favorable to the Japanese position that they were later put 
out in a separate volume, The Davao Problem, under Japanese 
sponsorship and bearing the "imprimatur" of the Davao Consul. 
In his report Farolan defended the landholding system in par-
ticular, calling the Japanese "contract developers" rather than 
sub-lessees, and urged that the Filipinos whose land was being 
developed be recognized as "patriotic" Filipinos rather than be 
condemned as "dummies." He praised the pakiaw system as a 
sensible method of opening new lands by means of employing 
Japanese energy, skill, labor, and capital, and asserted that the 
pakiaw was neither a sub-lease nor a violation of the statutory 
land laws. The Japanese, insisted Farolan, were not land-grab-
bers or law-breakers, and he recalled that as long ago as 1919, 
President Quezon himself in commenting on the attitude the 
government should take toward Japanese leases of public lands 
had said: 
It is not necessary for us to take a hostile attitude against the Japanese. 
We owe it to the cause of friendly and harmonious relations with Japan 
that those who were caught when we closed our doors be allowed to enter 
. . . . the thing in its lowest term reduces itself to common courtesy.131 
Farolan also noted that the American Governors-General 
had never done anything about Davao in the past nor had the 
Philippine Legislature, and he asked what new evidence had 
been brought to light which would now necessitate retroactive 
restrictive government action. After all, argued Farolan, the 
Japanese plantations were the most modern and progressive in 
Mindanao, and it was the Japanese who had given training to 
future Filipino settlers of virgin lands and who had opened up 
a profitable market for Philippine abaca, timber, and copra. 
Determined enemies of Japan were everywhere spreading fear 
and prejudice, Farolan concluded, but the people of the Philip-
pines would not be misled. Support for Farolan's position came 
from ex-Representative Isidro Vamenta of Mindanao, who 
called the whole "Davao Question" a "tempest in a teapot" and 
praised Farolan's "dispassionate" study while severely criticizing 
' 'Japan-baiting. "132 
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Rodriguez Undaunted but not Unopposed 
Secretary Rodriguez, however, obviously unmoved by Faro-
lan's report, continued undaunted on his original course. On 
June 20, 1935, he submitted a memorandum to Governor Gen-
eral Murphy calling for a number of specific actions to be taken 
which would directly affect only government officials and Fili-
pino citizens and therefore could not, he believed, be miscon-
strued as anti-Japanese. Rodriguez proposed: 
1. Cancellation or rejection of the leases or other applications of govern-
ment officials who had been found guilty of leasing or subleasing their 
holdings without the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Com-
merce in violation of the law. 
2. Rejection of the application of government officials who during their 
incumbency had taken advantage of their position in applying for 
public lands and in encumbering them or alienating them contrary 
to law. 
3. Cancellation or rejection of the leases or applications of the wives of 
government officials. 
4. Cancellation of the leases of such other persons as had been found to 
have leased or subleased their lands to third parties without the con-
sent of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Com-
merce.133 
With the approval of the Governor-General these measures took 
eflEect at once and before June was over, 33 Filipino government 
officials with holdings of 3,600 hectares tenanted by 303 Jap-
anese found their leases canceled.134 
On June 24, 1935, Secretary Rodriguez ruled the pakiaw 
system illegal and in violation of Article 18 of the land law. In 
August, Attorney Alfredo Fajardo of the Bureau of Lands, act-
ing under orders from Rodriguez, informed the Japanese settlers 
at Davao that illegal sub-leases were being canceled and that all 
improvements on such lands would be inventoried by the gov-
ernment so that appropriate compensation might be paid. 
Through September, Secretary Rodriguez had taken steps to 
cancel nearly two hundred135 applications of Philippine citizens 
on file in the Bureau of Lands for public lands in Davao which 
had been subleased by the applicants to Japanese in contraven-
tion of the land laws. Included among these were orders affect-
ing provincial governors, mayors, fiscals, Army officers, officials 
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of the insular government, prominent businessmen, and wives 
and relatives of all the preceding.136 The following was a typical 
example of a cancellation order: 
L. A. No. 2859 (E-246) 
PABLO LORENZO*3? 
Applicant 
Lot No. 783 Guianga Cadastre 
Malagos, Guianga, Davao 
ORDER: CANCELLATION OF APPLICATION AND 
RESCISSION OF LEASE CONTRACT 
As the tract of land covered by Lease Application No. 2589 (E-246) of 
PABLO LORENZO is not occupied by the applicant himself but other 
persons who are deriving benefits therefrom in open violation of the law 
and in contravention of the following material statements made under 
oath by the applicant: 
"In making this application for lease, I am not acting as agent for any 
person, corporation, organization or association to give them the benefits 
of the land entered, or any part thereof or the timber thereon, or the 
minerals therein, and I am not entering said land for the purpose of 
speculation but in good faith for my own exclusive benefit. I will not, 
directly or indirectly, make any agreement or contract, in any way or 
manner with any person or persons, corporation or association whatso-
ever, by which any right or rights which I may acquire from the govern-
ment will or may inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any person, 
persons, corporation or association of persons. I will not sell, assign, 
transfer, sublet or in any manner encumber the land or the right or 
rights that I may acquire, without the approval of the Secretary of Agri-
culture and Natural Resources first had and obtained as provided in Sec-
tion 37 of the Public Land Act No. 2874." 
the application is hereby cancelled; the lease contract executed in 
connection herewith rescinded; and whatever amount has been paid on 
account thereof as all improvements existing thereon are hereby forfeited 
in favor of the government. 
The District Land Officer, District No. 14, Bureau of Lands, Davao is 
hereby directed to take possession of the land and temporarily administer 
the same until it is applied for by and disposed of to other qualified 
applicants in accordance with law (Acts Nos. 2874, as amended and 3077) 
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
Manila, P.I., July 9, 1935 
SIMEON RAMOS 
Director of Lands 
APPROVED: 
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ 
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce138 
Vigorous and noisy protests from the Japanese in Davao 
began to be heard, and the Rodriguez lease cancellation program 
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encountered stiffening opposition. At first the Japanese settlers 
hoped to resist these measures by having the Filipino lease-
holders request court injunctions to prevent the Secretary of Ag-
riculture from enforcing his cancellation decisions and at the 
same time asking the courts to determine the legality of the 
pakiaw system. However, many of the Filipino landholders 
seemed willing to have the former agreements canceled by the 
government so that the original leases might be renegotiated and 
the Japanese might be reemployed as farm laborers on much 
more favorable terms financially for the Filipinos. 
Although the open opposition of the Japanese settlers at 
Davao to all of Secretary Rodriguez's restrictive measures was in-
creasingly evident, the Japanese consular staff preferred to work 
behind the scenes as much as possible. Both Davao Consul 
Kaneko and Consul General Kimura were privately persuaded 
that much of the current apparently anti-Japanese actions of the 
Department of Agriculture and Commerce were principally 
motivated by domestic political considerations, by a desire to 
demonstrate convincingly to the Americans that the Philippine 
authorities were concerned about the pattern of Japanese 
settlement, or by personal rivalries or vendettas among Fili-
pino politicians themselves. Obviously all of these possible 
reasons for tampering with the land situation among the 
Japanese involved very special Philippine problems which could 
hardly be discussed publicly. Therefore, of necessity the bulk of 
the efforts of the Japanese consular staff had to be directed at 
trying to convince both the settlers in Davao on the one hand 
and the Japanese government in Tokyo on the other hand not 
to become overly exercised because of certain overt manifesta-
tions which were really much more reflections of immediate and 
particular internal Philippine developments than of any serious 
or concerted antagonism toward Japanese interests in the Is-
lands. At the same time it was incumbent on the consular staff 
to try to minimize the actual effects of Secretary Rodriguez's 
several newly issued administrative orders in order not to permit 
the generally friendly relations between Japan and the Philip-
pines to be negatively affected. 
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One overriding consideration for the Japanese consulate was 
the fact that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth 
was scheduled for November 15. It was felt by the consular 
staff, and with much reason, that if the dispute over the enforce-
ment of the lease cancellation orders and over the pakiaw sys-
tem could be sustained on a quasi-legal basis until the onset of 
the Commonwealth administration, the chances for an ultimate 
solution not unfavorable to the Japanese were good. Evidence of 
this probability was often especially apparent in contacts be-
tween the Japanese and Senate President Quezon, who was to be 
the President of the Philippines under the Commonwealth gov-
ernment. As early as July, Secretary Rodriguez was submitting 
confidential reports to Quezon as to what his real intentions 
were, and Quezon in turn was reassuring the Japanese through 
talks with either his long time personal friend Morokuma or 
with Consul General Kimura.139 
Quezon himself repeatedly indicated that it was his desire 
to have the whole issue settled as amicably as possible in order 
to eliminate controversial questions between Japan and the 
Philippines so that the new Commonwealth could enjoy both 
the friendship and trust of its neighbor. However, Quezon, who 
was in so many ways the consummate politician, was eager to 
begin his tenure in the presidency with as nearly unanimous 
popular support as he could get. Accordingly, he found very 
persuasive Rodriguez's argument that, if the present problem 
of the Japanese in Davao should remain unsolved, the opposi-
tion might use that issue in the forthcoming general election to 
attack him and the incumbent Nacionalista Party. Thus, while 
Quezon seemed to be reassuring the Japanese that after Novem-
ber 15, he would reexamine the whole question, he also seemed 
to be in agreement with Rodriguez that for the present at least 
a superficial impression should be given to the public that the 
lease cancellation orders were being carried out.140 
Another subtle sign of the mitigation of Rodriguez's actions 
was passed along to the Japanese by officials of the Bureau of 
Lands. This was that an administrative decision of the Bureau 
gave affected owners of leased land a 60-day period of grace, 
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during which they could request reinvestigation of lease can-
cellation orders. And, if, as was apparently being done, the 
leaseholders asked for that reinvestigation only a day or two 
before the 60-day period expired, the reinvestigation obviously 
would take time and the cancellation order could not take effect 
until its completion. Thus, the second decision of the Bureau 
of Lands could probably not be expected before the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth and by that time it was very likely 
that there would be a change in the overall policy. It was also 
suggested to the Japanese that there might be a new Secretary 
of Agriculture and Commerce after November 15, in which case 
the entire situation would have to be restudied, and all pre-
viously issued cancellation orders would have to be suspended 
until the reexamination could be completed.141 Moreover, both 
Jose P. Laurel, the principal legal consultant to the Japanese, 
and Representative Felipe Buencamino, Jr., a longtime confi-
dant of Quezon, gave the Japanese consulate every reason to be-
lieve that they could expect a significant improvement in the 
Davao situation after November 15.142 
After the general election of 1935, and the victory of Quezon 
and his party, recently arrived Consul General Uchiyama Kiyo-
shi had an opportunity to talk with the President-elect and to try 
to clarify that official's possible future attitude toward the Davao 
problem. Quezon told Uchiyama that, although he had not yet 
really had time to study in detail the more recent developments 
in the situation or the legal basis of the various administrative 
orders involved, in any solution he would certainly give full con-
sideration to the acquired rights and interests of the Japanese. 
Quezon also pointed out that since Secretary Rodriguez's actions 
had been taken with the approval of the Governor General, it 
would be a very "delicate" matter for Quezon to negotiate openly 
with the Japanese before he became President. As to the future, 
he assured the Consul General that he intended to study the 
whole problem very closely, particularly its legal aspects, but he 
said that it was too soon for him to suggest any possible specific 
proposals. Nevertheless, Quezon did mention that an under-
standing might be worked out between the Japanese cultivators 
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and the government whereby the Japanese would pay the gov-
ernment whatever compensation had previously been paid to the 
leaseholders.143 
After his talk with Quezon, Uchiyama told the Foreign Of-
fice that the main policy of the Japanese during the next few 
weeks prior to the President's inauguration should be to do 
nothing which would worsen the situation so as not to force the 
present administration toward harsher measures nor to compro-
mise the future administration from the possibility of evolving 
somewhat more lenient policies. T o this end he cautioned Davao 
Consul Kaneko that the Japanese residents in Davao should be 
restrained in their conduct and in their reactions to the moves 
of Secretary Rodriguez. 
In addition, Uchiyama expressed to the Foreign Office his 
hope that the press in Japan would also exercise restraint in their 
reporting on the Davao situation. While calling Quezon "a 
very agreeable person," Uchiyama admitted that it was hard 
to place full confidence in his statements—apparently a nod to 
the political acumen of the President-elect. Nevertheless, the 
Consul General did believe that Quezon was sensitive to the 
potential seriousness of the Davao question in international re-
lations and that therefore he would be sympathetic to the Jap-
anese position ''to a certain extent."144 
However, despite the warnings of Uchiyama, on September 
14,145 a seven-hour mass meeting of the Japanese in Davao was 
held, and through Consul Kaneko a 700-word cablegram was 
sent to Tokyo demanding the assistance and support of the Jap-
anese government. Secretary Rodriguez then announced that 
there would be no evictions until he had had an opportunity to 
hold further conferences with Japanese representatives. On 
September 16, Mr. Wajima Eiji of the Bureau of American Af-
fairs of the Japanese Foreign Office arrived in Manila to investi-
gate the Davao question, and the following day, September 17, 
the Japanese Association of Davao advised its 5,000 members to 
remain on their lands despite all interferences and obstacles. On 
September 19, Secretary Rodriguez, now seemingly on the de-
fensive, reiterated that his cancellation orders were directed at 
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Filipinos who were the lessees, not against the Japanese who 
were the sub-lessees.146 On October 1, support for this latter 
view of Rodriguez came from Governor General Murphy, who 
on that date met with a visiting delegation of ten members of 
Japan's House of Peers. Murphy told his callers that the Davao 
problem was basically a question of correcting the relationships 
between the government and the Filipino leaseholders. How-
ever, he carefully commented that he hoped that in the excite-
ment the rights of the third party, namely the Japanese colon-
ists, would be fully respected.147 
Solutions Galore 
Unfortunately the questions raised by the Davao land prob-
lem were not capable of simple solutions. For example, no one 
was really sure that the Japanese arrangements for working the 
land in Mindanao were in fact illegal. T h e Japanese had em-
ployed the best legal talent available from the beginning of their 
settlement in the Philippines in order to try to avoid exactly the 
kind of situation with which they were now confronted. It was 
Willard Price who so aptly termed the Japanese in the Philip-
pines "lawyer-abiding."148 The Japanese also could very justi-
fiably ask why at this late date the Philippine government 
should suddenly try to rule their landholdings illegal when that 
same government had known for decades about leases and sub-
leases and the pakiaw system in Davao. And what would happen 
if the leases were actually canceled? Would the American State 
Department permit such an obvious irritant to United States-
Japanese relations to be intensified still further? Could such a 
decision be enforced against the determined opposition of the 
Japanese settlers? Would the Japanese government stand idly 
by while its nationals were dispossessed from their homes? Or 
would the local indigenous inhabitants of Davao come to the 
assistance of the Japanese, as their previously demonstrated atti-
tude had already indicated that they might, and pit Filipino 
against Filipino? What would be the effects of all of this on the 
Philippine economy,149 on the Philippine export trade, and on 
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the future development of a peaceful, independent Philippine 
republic? 
By mid-October, 1935, a number of suggestions for the reso-
lution of the Davao land problem were emanating from various 
sources. One proposal appeared in a rather peculiar article en-
titled "DAVAO W H A T A B O U T IT?" in the radical journal 
Union. The author, after stating that the Japanese were in 
Davao to stay and that they would defend their holdings there 
to the end, recommended that the Philippines should follow the 
example of California and should pass strict alien land laws pro-
hibiting aliens from owning real estate in the Islands. The logic 
of the proposal is dubious, because elsewhere in the same article 
the writer described how cleverly the Japanese in California had 
evaded the provisions of the alien land laws. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the Philippines could ill afford to antagonize 
Japan in the way that the United States had as a result of the 
California legislation.150 
Two somewhat more feasible recommendations were re-
ported by the Manila Tribune to be under discussion in official 
circles. One was to have the National Assembly pass an enabling 
act under which aliens could continue to cultivate and strip 
hemp on the lands now occupied by them with a share of the 
proceeds from the harvest to be paid to the Commonwealth 
government as a tax, instead of to the sublessors. T h e other pro-
posal was that on any lands confiscated by the government under 
lease cancellation procedures just compensation be paid for the 
improvements made by the Japanese on such lands. The Jap-
anese themselves estimated the total value of the improvements 
they had made on the Davao lands to be in the neighborhood of 
P30,000,000.151 
A Japanese visitor to the Philippines, Mr. S. Hamano, a 
representative of the foreign news service of Nippon Dempo 
and a member of the East Asia Economic Research Bureau, made 
his own survey of the situation in Davao. He suggested that the 
Philippine government grant to all alien landholders a blanket 
extension of twenty-five years during which the lessees and sub-
lessees could make their own readjustments. At any rate, said Mr. 
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Hamano, since the Japanese had already held the land in ques-
tion for fifteen years, the right of possession demanded that they 
continue to hold the property. If this situation were interfered 
with, he again warned of "serious consequences."152 
When this latter remark appeared in the Manila press, the 
resultant outcry over what was termed Japan's threatening atti-
tude toward the Philippine government153 greatly upset Consul 
General Uchiyama, who had been trying to "keep the lid on" 
as much as possible. Publicly Uchiyama stressed that Hamano 
spoke only for himself and did not represent the official view of 
the Japanese government, which had always sought to reach a 
constructive settlement of the Davao problem. Privately the 
Consul General was obviously deeply upset by Hamano's state-
ment, and Uchiyama told the Foreign Office he intended to repri-
mand Hamano for his "rashness."154 
Immediately following the inauguration of the Common-
wealth, Representative Felipe Buencamino said that he intended 
to introduce a bill which would bring about a full and final 
settlement of the Filipino-Japanese friction over the Davao land 
leases. His proposal was very simply to legalize all leases in the 
province as they then stood including those which the Secretary 
of Agriculture and Commerce had proposed to declare null and 
void. Representative Buencamino maintained that Americans 
and Filipinos were the ones who held the original leases anyway 
and that the Japanese who had sub-leases were the "innocent 
victims of circumstances."155 He also stated that the whole 
amount of land involved was only 150,000 acres and that the 
persons involved were small landowners since the large corpora-
tions had clear titles to their holdings. Therefore, said Buen-
camino, by validating all of the disputed Japanese sub-leases the 
new Commonwealth economy would be given a significant boost 
forward and friendly ties with the most powerful nation in the 
Orient would be assured. There were many in the Philippines 
who believed that this plan had the support of President Quezon 
because of its author, i.e., Buencamino. Perhaps more im-
portantly many believed that this was also an "American plan" 
which had the support of the visiting Congressional delegates 
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who had come to the Islands for the inauguration of the Com-
monwealth and of the State Department. This latter rationale 
was based on the view that in the United States, both Congress 
and the executive branch were eager to eliminate international 
complications in the Far East and to smooth the path for the 
infant Commonwealth regime.156 
However, Secretary Rodriguez vehemently disagreed with 
the Buencamino proposal. Such a retrogressive step, said the 
Secretary, would be a cowardly act on the part of the new gov-
ernment in a clearcut matter of the enforcement of Philippine 
law. It would be highly inadvisable, he stated, to pass under 
pressure a new law clearly designed to benefit particular indi-
viduals and interests. If such action as Representative Buen-
camino proposed were taken, the Secretary argued, such a 
palpable demonstration of national weakness would in the long 
run be far more costly to the newly independent state than would 
any immediate prolongation of Philippine-Japanese tension.157 
In support of his position Secretary Rodriguez had at hand "A 
Brief Statement of Some of the Important Facts about Davao 
and the Present Davao Land Problem in Connection with Jap-
anese Land Holdings/ ' This was a report dated November 20, 
1935, compiled and submitted by a committee appointed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, to execute the orders 
cancelling and rejecting illegal land holdings in Davao.158 
The report began with a statistical survey of Japanese popu-
lation, investments and land holdings in Davao. Then it 
described Secretary Rodriguez's order canceling leases or reject-
ing applications in violation of laws governing public lands. T h e 
reactions and protests of the Japanese community were duly re-
corded, and on the final two pages the committee presented its 
own summary of the entire problem. T h e group stated that the 
Japanese being excellent businessmen controlled the agriculture, 
commerce, and industry of Davao Province and that they were 
sending out of the Philippines money that ought to be circulat-
ing in the Islands. The committee further concluded that 
Japan's unique traditions, religion, and history would always 
differentiate the Japanese from their Filipino neighbors and 
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that the Japanese in the Islands were intensely nationalistic and 
could, in the committee's words, "never become Filipinos. , , 
Finally, the report offered the opinion that the Japanese foothold 
in Davao was now too solidly entrenched for the Japanese to give 
up and that Davao would therefore be a strategic threat in any 
possible future conflict between the United States and Japan. 
However, despite the contentious tone of this report, first 
behind the scenes and then publicly, as had been earlier pre-
dicted by the Japanese consular staff, the Davao situation did 
begin to undergo a change following the inauguration of Quezon 
as President of the Commonwealth in his own right. For on 
November 25, 1935, Consul General Uchiyama was able to in-
form the Foreign Office that on the 24th, Quezon had held a 
talk with Laurel, whom the new chief executive had invited to 
join his cabinet. Laurel in turn told Uchiyama that the two men 
had discussed the subject of Davao and that Quezon had told 
Laurel that as of the 24th, the President had secretly ordered 
Secretary Rodriguez to cease all administrative actions with 
regard to Davao and that Quezon himself planned a visit to 
Davao the following year for a first hand inspection of the situa-
tion.159 
Apparently influenced by the changed atmosphere in the 
administration now that President Quezon was in full command, 
a seemingly more moderate Secretary Rodriguez addressed a let-
ter to the Japanese Association of Davao, requesting their co-
operation in finding a solution to the land question. On Decem-
ber 3, Taguma Torataro, president of the Association, replied to 
the Secretary by expressing his willingness to cooperate but with 
the suggestion that before any action be taken by the Common-
wealth Government, it would be proper for the appropriate 
authorities to hear the testimony of the Japanese settlers in 
Davao Province. Apparently recognizing that his efforts to can-
cel illegal land holdings were being frustrated by the determined 
opposition of the Japanese at Davao as well as by the diplomatic 
efforts of the Japanese consular officials in both Manila and 
Davao and desiring to end the controversy as quickly and as 
equitably as possible, Secretary Rodriguez on January 2, 1936, 
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formally requested President Quezon to define the policies which 
the Department of Agriculture and Commerce was to follow.160 
Up to that date the Secretary had been acting in accordance 
with decisions taken and guide lines established under the ad-
ministration of former Governor-General Murphy. In view of 
the stalemate which prevailed between the authorities in Manila 
and the Japanese settlers, it now seemed, therefore, both neces-
sary and correct for Rodriguez to ask the new Commonwealth 
President to provide new policy directives covering the situation 
at Davao. At the end of January President Quezon in his first 
public official action with regard to Davao set aside 4,652 hec-
tares of public land in Kapalong, Taguin, Davao Province, as 
withdrawn from settlement until a decision could be reached 
on what the government's program was to be. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese Consulate was continuing to bring 
pressure behind the scenes, and on February 6, Consul General 
Uchiyama in a lengthy report to Tokyo described certain confi-
dences exchanged with Jose P. Laurel.161 Laurel had told the 
Japanese Consul General that he was being considered for an 
important government post, either as legal adviser to the Presi-
dent or as Secretary of Justice or as a Supreme Court Justice. 
Laurel feared that if he rejected any of these posts his critics 
would say that he had no need of them since he was being so well 
rewarded by the Japanese for his efforts in their behalf on the 
Davao question. Uchiyama told Laurel that the Japanese pre-
ferred him in the position of legal adviser to the President, but 
Laurel replied that he was too old to "be a bellboy/' that there 
was presently no vacancy in the position of Secretary of Justice, 
and that if he turned down the Supreme Court post the Davao 
question would be adversely affected. Commented Uchiyama: 
There is some doubt in my mind as to whether or not he is seeking to 
run out on us because of the difficulty of getting a fundamental settle-
ment of the Davao question. But we cannot do anything about the fact 
that he is a Filipino.162 
Quickly and with the help of Laurel the Japanese sought 
another equally cooperative Filipino attorney-politician who 
would do their bidding for reasonable financial reward. All 
64 
parties agreed to the selection of Laurel's law partner, Assembly-
man Pedro Sabido, who was considered an influential figure in 
the Philippine Assembly; and on February 6, Laurel came to the 
Japanese consulate to say that he had agreed to accept mem-
bership on the Supreme Court, though he would also from time 
to time act in a private capacity as Quezon's legal adviser. Ac-
cordingly Uchiyama reported to Tokyo: 
So he [Laurel] will still have the opportunity to give proper advice to the 
President on the Davao question. But in view of the fact that he will be 
a judicial official he will not be able to enter into arrangements which 
would result in his receiving monetary payments from the outside. So 
far as his arrangement with this office is concerned, I intend to arrive at 
a convenient arrangement after consulting with him further.163 
Uchiyama also recommended to the Foreign Office that no de-
cision on the legality of the pakiaw system be pressed as long as 
the cancellation orders were not enforced. 
In a subsequent dispatch to Tokyo, Uchiyama said that the 
Davao land question was being completely turned over by the 
consulate to Sabido, who was being given 2,000 pesos for the 
present and would be paid 10,000 pesos when the Davao prob-
lem was settled satisfactorily.164 Sabido had told Uchiyama that 
there had been some objection to Laurel's Supreme Court ap-
pointment because of his reportedly pro-Japanese sentiments 
but that President Quezon had no objection to making appoint-
ments of men who were pro-Japanese. Interestingly, in his dis-
patch Uchiyama did not accept Sabido's interpretation but 
rather took the position that the appointment of Laurel was a 
politically astute move by Quezon designed to pacify one of his 
more articulate critics.165 
Quezon Takes Charge 
Finally on February 12, 1936, almost one year after the 
issuance of his first report on illegal land tenure in Davao, Secre-
tary Rodriguez announced publicly that the whole problem was 
now in the hands of President Quezon, who would study the 
situation himself and would make known his decision in due 
time. T h e transference of jurisdiction from the Secretary of 
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Agriculture and Commerce to the President immediately eased 
the existing tensions. In the first place, the very center of the 
entire controversy, Secretary Rodriguez, was now, in effect, re-
moved from the scene. Secondly, the problem would now be 
handled at the highest level, and President Quezon had the 
confidence and trust of the Japanese in the Philippines as well 
as the good will of the Japanese government, which was eager 
to establish close and friendly relations with the new Philip-
pine Commonwealth. Thirdly, the statement that the Presi-
dent would ''study'' the Davao question was politically and 
diplomatically extremely astute. Clearly, any study, especially a 
presidential study, implies care, depth, and above all time, which 
realistically in this case meant an indefinite postponement of any 
enforcement of the earlier lease cancellation orders and thus a 
general calming of a potentially disruptive situation. 
By late February the passage of time had already begun to 
permit better perspective to be brought to bear on the Davao 
problem. This was evident in a general overview of the situation 
which the recently hired Pedro Sabido reported to Vice Consul 
Kihara Jitaro.166 Sabido pointed out that most influential voices 
in the Commonwealth agreed that the Philippines must main-
tain friendly relations with Japan in the light of the Asian ori-
gins of both peoples, the forthcoming independence of the 
Islands, and the desire for peace in the Far East. However, 
Sabido said that emerging Filipino nationalism, American anti-
Japanese propaganda, and the Manchurian Incident had all 
contributed to a Japanophobia which caused many individuals 
to misunderstand the Japanese colonization in Davao as having 
political rather than simply economic significance. Therefore, 
it was Sabido's view that the Japanese themselves had reached, 
in effect, a time for decision, i.e., whether to hold on to, develop 
fully and protect their present holdings, or to plan for future 
expansion. 
Sabido further indicated that it was his belief a solution of 
the Davao land problem satisfactory to the Japanese could not be 
expected either from the Philippine courts or through the Na-
tional Assembly, since both the judicial and legislative branches 
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of the Commonwealth government, in Sabido's view, would be 
subject to the then current anti-Japanese tendency of public 
opinion. The advice of Sabido was that the Japanese could 
probably anticipate a much more equitable resolution of the 
issue from the executive branch, despite the previous antipathy 
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and in particular 
from President Quezon. Perhaps, however, some six or seven 
years hence, when independence was secure and economic dif-
ficulties would have worsened, and the "enlightenment" pro-
gram of the Japanese would have taken effect, then it might be 
relatively easy, thought Sabido, to have the Assembly legalize 
the pakiaw system or to take some other legislative action which 
would affirm the right of the Japanese to cultivate land at Davao 
without interference. 
Therefore, for the present it seemed likely to Sabido that 
the Japanese could expect the President to follow a solution 
which might immediately cause the Japanese to lose a few sub-
leases, through the carrying out of cancellation procedures, and 
to have to suspend any further extension of their land holdings 
for the next few years. However, this result, according to Sabido, 
would be for the Japanese to "gain a big thing by sacrificing a 
small thing," as he put it. For by carrying out a few cancella-
tions as proposed, the face of the President, Secretary Rodriguez, 
and the Commonwealth government both at home and abroad 
would be saved and the overall interests of the Japanese in Davao 
would be sustained. Sabido also recommended, and the consu-
late agreed, that this probable solution should be kept secret for 
the time being and should not be disclosed particularly to the 
settlers in Davao in view of their hostility as well as their vola-
tility. 
Consul General Uchiyama, after reporting these views of 
Sabido, told the Foreign Office that he intended to see the Presi-
dent once more to point out to him the facts of the Japanese 
contribution to the development of Davao and to stress the ur-
gency of a harmonious solution to the problem there both from 
the standpoint of Philippine policy toward Japan and from the 
standpoint of basic morality. In addition, Vice Consul Kihara 
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sought out the views of Sergio Osmena and Manuel Roxas, since 
the Japanese consular staff in Manila believed the next President 
of the Philippines would be either one or the other. Both men 
stressed the necessity of Philippine-Japanese amity and assured 
Kihara that they would support a solution worked out by the 
Japanese consulate.167 
As he had promised Consul General Uchiyama as early as 
November 7, 1935,168 in April, 1936, President Quezon made a 
personal inspection tour of the Japanese lands in Davao and met 
with leading personalities of the province, both Filipino and 
Japanese. On his trip the President was accompanied by his 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce (Rodriguez); Interior 
(Elpidio Quirino); and Justice (Jose Yulo); the Director of 
Prisons, Colonel Paulino Santos; the Director of the Bureau of 
Non-Christian Tribes, Teopisto Guingona; former Secretary of 
Finance, Miguel Unson; ex-Senator Jose Generoso, assistant legal 
adviser to the President; Captain Bonner Fellers, aide-de-camp 
to Quezon; and key members of the National Assembly, includ-
ing Assemblyman Sabido, who was identified in the press as coun-
sel for ''those affected."169 Also in the presidential party were 
Consul General Uchiyama and the President's good friend 
Morokuma Yasaku of the Ohta Development Company. 
Even before the President reached Davao, Sabido who had 
accompanied the party en route south from Manila returned to 
Manila, ostensibly to prepare certain documents. However, he 
reported in full to Vice Consul Kihara what his impressions were 
of Quezon's present attitude on the basis of several conversations 
during the voyage.170 First of all, Sabido told Kihara that the 
President did not intend to solve the Davao problem at that 
time but that his tour was part of his previously announced 
''study," which would ultimately result in his "decision." Sabido 
also noted that the President's being accompanied by his personal 
legal adviser Jose Generoso was a gesture to the Japanese, who 
were suspicious of Secretary of Justice Yulo as being prejudiced 
against them, and that after the presidential party left Davao, 
Generoso would remain an additional two weeks to make a 
thorough investigation of the legal situation. According to what 
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Quezon had told him, Sabido was also able to assure Kihara that, 
while the President felt that Filipinos who had violated the land 
laws should be punished, neither the rights nor the interests of 
Filipinos who had observed the laws or of Japanese cultivators 
would be in any way affected. Moreover, Quezon had also told 
Sabido that all of the pakiaw contracts then in effect should be 
allowed to run their course, although he had not indicated 
whether or not he favored renewals of those that had already ex-
pired or were about to expire. It was still Sabido's considered 
opinion that, if necessary, expired contracts, which were rela-
tively few in number, should be let go by the boards by the 
Japanese as long as those still in effect would be permitted to 
stand. This was another facet of his plan to "gain a big thing 
by sacrificing a small thing.'' 
Sabido also advised Kihara that, as soon as the President ar-
rived in Davao, Quezon intended to hear the views on separate 
occasions of both Filipinos and Japanese who were concerned 
with the land question. Therefore, Sabido suggested that those 
Filipinos who were heard should be "oriented in a direction 
which will be advantageous to us."171 Further, he urged that 
those Japanese who appeared before the President strongly assert 
that the objective of the Japanese in Davao was merely cultiva-
tion rather than permanent possession of land and that, since in 
the past the government had never interfered with the pakiaw 
system, any precipitate action to cancel such contracts now would 
be extremely unfair. In fact, Sabido proposed that the Japanese 
request a uniform extension of all such contracts for a period of 
approximately ten years. His reasoning was that each contract 
had a different expiration date, and thus each time a contract ex-
pired a new crisis was liable to occur. If such a uniform exten-
sion could be arranged, Sabido thought that at the end of ten 
years the possibility for maneuvers favorable to the Japanese 
in a fully independent Philippines would be far better than at 
the present time. In short, it was Sabido's idea that the Japanese 
position would be far stronger if it were presented in the broad-
est terms with the emphasis on their general situation rather 
than if it were argued on the basis of individual cases.172 
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All in all, Sabido's report on the views of President Quezon 
agreed with what Consul General Uchiyama had been able to 
glean from his personal talks with the President and with the 
tenor of reports appearing in the Philippine press. The belief 
that had been adhered to by the Japanese consular staff through-
out the preceding year, namely that after the inauguration of 
the Commonwealth the Davao situation would be significantly 
improved and that Quezon himself would be willing and eager 
to improve relations with Japan, certainly seemed to have been 
justified. At the very moment of the President's visit to Davao, 
for example, the press stated that, since there was an earnest de-
sire for settlement of the problem on both sides, a compromise 
settlement was believed almost certain. Moreover, according to 
one Manila daily, while the basic intention of the administra-
tion was to preserve the Philippine patrimony at Davao, Que-
zon's ability to "grasp any situation" anticipated a "happy 
settlement."173 In fact, so improved had the atmosphere become 
as a result of the President's personal intervention that after a 
conference with Morokuma and the Japanese Consuls, Quezon 
could jokingly say: "I have already sworn allegiance to the 
Japanese Emperor."174 Consul General Uchiyama too was 
quoted as saying: "There is nothing in the world that cannot 
be solved by friendship and good understanding. Banish fear 
and suspicion, and everything will be all right."175 
After a round of whirlwind tours, conferences, speeches, and 
banquets at Davao, President Quezon and his party returned to 
Manila without announcing any solution of what some observers 
called the first crucial test of his presidential statesmanship. How 
well the President was to pass this test began to be evident in a 
press conference held shortly after his return to the capital: 
THE PRESS: Mr. President, will you please tell us something about the 
Davao question? 
THE PRESIDENT: Well, gentlemen, first of all, nothing about that 
Davao question, that is, no steps will be taken without first consulting 
with the Legislature; second, every case here has been considered in its 
own merit. We have to be sure of the facts and the circumstances attend-
ing the case before we can decide what can be done in every single case. 
Now there seems to be, or there has been an idea prevalent among the 
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people that if the Secretary of Agriculture found that the terms of a lease 
have been violated the government can take the lot. It is not so. Even in 
the case where there is a clear violation of the terms of the lease, the power 
of the Executive Department of Government does not go any further 
than to declare that lease terminated. If the man in possession of the land 
refuses to give back the land to the government, the government would 
have to go to courts and let the courts determine whether the lease or the 
terms of the contract have been broken. This idea that any time that 
Rodriguez said, "You have broken the terms of the lease, and therefore, I 
take the land" is not true. Even if a tenant is not willing to get out of 
the land, the government can not use force, for it is uncivilized to use 
force. You can not take possession of anything by force. You can not 
dispossess anybody by force who is in actual possession of a real movable 
property; you can only dispossess him of his property by decree of the 
court. Now after the court has decreed, then the Executive Department 
will have to execute the decision of the court. If you will let me explain 
further, you can call a police and say you want to dispossess a certain 
person who is in possession of your house. That person can stay there 
even for a month, and yet you can not dispossess him or drive him away. 
You have to go to the courts. I think that that is the law, otherwise people 
in possession of real or movable property can not be deprived of their 
possession by the government. 
THE PRESS: Is there any refusal to renew any lease that has expired? 
THE PRESIDENT: There is no lease that has expired. 
THE PRESS: So that the government should ask authorization from the 
Legislature as to the cancellation of the lease? 
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, or the authorization of the courts. 
THE PRESS: Mr. President, if you go to Japan, would you discuss the 
Davao case with the Japanese government? 
THE PRESIDENT: No, as a matter of fact, there is nothing to be dis-
cussed between this government and the Japanese Government. There 
are Japanese nationals that are being involved and I want the consul to 
know and to assure him that the Government of this Commonwealth is 
not going to act arbitrarily in handling this question. The Government 
of Japan is not involved there. 
THE PRESS: Is there anything that the Government of the Common-
wealth has taken as to this Davao question? 
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing has been done as yet. Some time ago I told 
the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend any action on the matter, until 
something more is found out as to the real situation; so there is no lease 
that has been cancelled. You know the Department of Agriculture has 
been informed that the terms of the contract have been violated; that the 
Department is cancelling the contract, and therefore the Department de-
mands that the government be given possession of the land. If the party 
concerned does not wish to do it and denies that the terms of the contract 
have been violated, then the courts will have to decide whether the terms 
of the contract have been violated or not, basing on the facts that may 
be proven in court. 
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There are many things said about this Davao situation. In fact, certain 
statements and information regarding the Davao situation that have 
been printed in the papers are not exactly true. Somebody has been talk-
ing loose somewhere or statements have been placed in their mouth. I have 
been quoted for having said, "The Japanese Consul can not bluff me." 
Why, anybody who has a common sense can see that that is not the proper 
language to use.176 
Clearly these remarks by the Philippine President were de-
signed to becalm still further the turbulence that had been sur-
rounding the Davao land question ever since the appointment of 
Eulogio Rodriguez to the office of Secretary of Agriculture and 
Commerce. It is also worthy of note that practically simultane-
ously with Quezon's press conference statements Consul General 
Uchiyama had a reassuring conversation with United States 
High Commissioner Frank Murphy, who told Uchiyama that 
from the beginning the American government had wanted to 
avoid any disputes among Japan, the Philippines, and the 
United States over Davao. Murphy said that the existing inter-
ests of the Japanese should be respected and that expiring leases 
should be permitted to be renewed under appropriate condi-
tions. Moreover, the American High Commissioner told the 
Consul General that, while he did not want to interfere in Phil-
ippine internal matters, since that was an issue of great impor-
tance to United States-Japanese friendship, he would work for 
an equitable solution by expressing Uchiyama's views to Que-
zon the next time he talked with him.177 
On May 11, President Quezon gave a dinner for some forty 
members of the Philippine National Assembly. Pedro Sabido, 
who was present, later told the Japanese Consul General that 
he had held the floor for some two and a half hours, presenting 
a series of points on the subject of Davao. Sabido reportedly 
told his listeners that in the future the Philippines could not 
rely solely on America in politics or economics, especially in 
view of the unsympathetic attitude of the American Congress in 
regard to Philippine sugar and coconut oil. Thus, he suggested, 
the Islands would be well advised to develop friendly relations 
with Japan, particularly through economic cooperation and 
specifically by means of the protection of Japanese interests in 
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Davao, the development of which had been such a boon to the 
Philippine economy. Sabido said that he had also decried at-
tempts to link the Manchurian problem to developments in 
Davao and that he had described Japan's actions in Manchuria 
as a magnanimous effort to sustain the independence of that un-
happy land. According to Sabido, President Quezon listened at-
tentively to this discourse and said that Sabido's views should 
be given careful consideration.178 
Just a little over a month later, Sabido told the Japanese 
that he had been consulted by Quezon in the preparation of 
remarks on the subject of Davao, which the President intended 
to include in his message to the First National Assembly. Sabido 
predicted that, in a speech which only President Quezon was 
powerful enough to make, he would indirectly warn the Philip-
pine legislators not to discuss the Davao question any further.179 
The accuracy of Sabido's prediction seemed to be born out when 
on June 23, 1936, before the Assembly Quezon discussed Davao 
as follows: 
Much has been printed in the local press and foreign papers regard-
ing the ownership of large tracts of land by Japanese subjects in Davao. 
There is an impression that Davao is actually owned by the Japanese. 
Such is not the case. 
The total area owned, leased and/or cultivated by the Japanese in 
Davao is about sixty thousand hectares out of almost two million hectares 
that constitutes the total area of the Public Domain in that Province. It 
is true that Japanese investments in Davao are considerable, and that 
there are doubts expressed as to the legality of some of the transactions 
entered into between Filipinos and Japanese regarding the Public Do-
main leased to Filipinos by the Government. In these cases the Govern-
ment will act in accordance with law and equity. Before any course of 
action is finally decided upon by the Administration, I shall advise with 
the Assembly and take no steps without your previous knowledge. There 
is nothing in the so-called Davao problem that should cause serious con-
cern.180 
It was the last sentence which was of particular importance, 
for critics of the President claimed consistently that he had 
said, "There is no Davao problem,'' a statement which, as far as 
can be ascertained, he never made.181 What he had said at Davao 
in April in the course of his inspection tour was that there was 
no problem which with good will and determination on both 
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sides could not be solved, a remark calculated to lessen the pas-
sions that had been aroused during the debates of the preceding 
year. The same purpose and desire were once more evident in 
his very temperate and carefully considered remarks to the Na-
tional Assembly previously quoted. Nor did President Quezon 
mean to convey that, although there was nothing in the situation 
at Davao which "should cause serious concern/ ' he intended to 
refrain from taking whatever action he felt to be necessary. In-
action since February, the Presidential trip, friendly contacts 
with Japanese officials, and now the moderate words of the mes-
sage to the Assembly had all served the end of greatly relaxing 
the highly charged atmosphere which the President had in-
herited at the beginning of his administration. He was now 
ready to recommend positive steps in order to ameliorate a situ-
ation which he himself undoubtedly recognized as a possible 
future source of potential danger to a free Philippines. 
In that same message to the First National Assembly Presi-
dent Quezon also had said: 
A vast and rich territory with untapped natural resources is a tempta-
tion to enterprising nations that are looking for an outlet for their excess 
populations. While no nation has the right to violate the territorial in-
tegrity of another nation, people that lack the energy, ability or desire 
to make use of the resources which Divine Providence has placed in their 
hands, afford an excuse for a more energetic and willful people to deprive 
them of their lawful heritage. If, therefore, we are resolved to conserve 
Mindanao for ourselves and our posterity, we must bend all our efforts 
to occupy and develop it and guard it against avarice and greed. . . . The 
members of this Assembly, especially those who visited Mindanao re-
cently with me, are conscious, I feel sure, of our grave responsibility to 
encourage settlement and develop Mindanao. . . . I invite you therefore, 
to give this matter preferential consideration . . .182 
In other words, what the President was recommending as a 
positive solution to the vexing problem of Japanese penetration 
of Mindanao was a concerted program to bring about the devel-
opment of the remainder of the island by the Filipinos them-
selves in order to prevent the further alienation of public lands 
by foreigners of any nationality. He was in fact suggesting that 
the Davao problem might best be solved by simply confining the 
Japanese to the area in Davao Province which they then held, 
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by surrounding the lands under their control with lands culti-
vated by Filipinos, and by covering the remainder of the island 
of Mindanao with government-supported colonization projects. 
Under the direction and leadership of President Quezon, a 
National Land Settlement Administration was established with 
the purpose of assisting Filipino migrants to move from heavily 
populated areas to new lands in Davao, Cotabato, and Lanao 
provinces.183 Of equal importance with the creation of new 
agricultural settlements was the building of new roads which 
would serve first to attract laborers for their construction and 
then to provide arteries of comunication to facilitate the move-
ment of new settlers into hitherto unoccupied and uncultivated 
regions. Originally, in line with the President's recommenda-
tions, government funds were made available for long-term 
loans to would-be homesteaders to encourage them to move 
from overcrowded sections of Luzon, Cebu, etc. However, once 
the program was started in earnest, voluntary migration was so 
heavy and so rapid that those funds could be applied to other 
projects such as road building. 
Whether or not in the long run this solution would have 
worked (and there are many who doubt it) will remain forever 
a moot question, since the Davao situation had changed rela-
tively little when war broke out in December, 1941. But in 
retrospect the diplomacy and statesmanship exercised by Presi-
dent Quezon, with the tacit support of the American govern-
ment, seem most impressive. As in so many difficult govern-
mental decisions both past and present, those on the outside, 
including on the one hand the Japanese settlers and their Fili-
pino advocates such as Sabido and on the other hand a small but 
vocal group of anti-Japanese Filipinos both in and out of the 
Assembly, demanded resolute and unflinching decisions. How-
ever, such decisions would in this particular instance either have 
confirmed the Japanese in their holdings or in quite the opposite 
fashion would have, if necessary, forcibly ejected the Japanese 
from lands which they were said to hold illegally. But President 
Quezon for his part recognized that the question of Davao was 
a very delicate one with many more ramifications than either 
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his critics or perhaps even the industrious Secretary Rodriguez 
realized. Therefore, his original procrastination, his personal 
trip to the area, and his minimizing of the problem in speaking 
to the National Assembly wrere all directed toward an ultimate 
solution which could immediately offend none of the parties 
involved in the controversy but which might in the end retain 
the rich heritage of Mindanao for the Filipinos themselves. 
Despite these astute tactics, however, Quezon's efforts were 
undoubtedly made more difficult by the almost exclusive ethnic 
communalism and cultural isolation which characterized Jap-
anese life at Davao. Other than the marriages of convenience 
contracted between some Japanese males and some Bagobo 
tribeswomen, there were few Filipino-Japanese unions, and 
Filipino-Japanese mestizos were rarely seen. The Japanese As-
sociation of Davao was the very heart of Davao community life 
and was unquestionably far more meaningful to every Japanese 
in Davao than any organ of the Philippine government. In 
fact, as the Japanese settlers discovered with marked frequency 
the "pliability" of all levels of Filipino officialdom, disdain for 
Philippine authority increased; and the role of the Japanese 
Association became quasi-governmental. It was the Association 
which was directly concerned with the economic and social well 
being of the Japanese colony. It was the Association, too, which 
through its efforts sustained all of the traditional Japanese cul-
tural patterns and habits and a full Japanese social life so that 
being in Davao would be little different from being back home. 
Among the most successful of its undertakings was the mainte-
nance of Japanese schools run along Japanese lines and staffed 
by a faculty of imported Japanese teachers. 
The Japanese in Davao received their information from two 
Japanese-language daily newspapers, one of them published in 
Manila, and had a number of Japanese-language bulletins and 
magazines also available to them. Shinto and Buddhist religious 
functionaries were on hand to fill roles identical with those they 
performed in the homeland. Physicians, veterinarians, techni-
cians, and craftsmen were all Japanese. One could, if one were 
a Japanese at Davao, literally live for weeks or months without 
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having any contact with Filipinos at all, except for common 
laborers or perhaps a Filipino attorney, who might well be serv-
ing as a dummy. In fact it is difficult to determine what, if any, 
Philippine customs, practices, or traits were acquired by the 
Japanese.184 As Professor Cody has stated in describing the 
Japanese community at Davao, "In their homes, schools, news-
papers, and in spirit the retention of national identity remained 
firm."185 
Thus, the mollifying endeavors of President Quezon en-
countered both the frequent volatility and communal exclusive-
ness of the Japanese settlers in Davao and the suspicion with 
which the Philippine public increasingly regarded their self-
isolated Japanese neighbors. Moreover, the pressures of Jap-
anese expansionism on the mainland of Asia also contributed in 
the late 1930's to a more widely articulated Filipino view of the 
Davao region as a "Little Japan" or "Davaokuo." Interestingly, 
the Japanese diplomatic establishment in the Philippines, in 
working with the Commonwealth administration toward a mu-
tually satisfactory resolution of the Davao question, faced the 
same problems. For the local consular staff spent much of its 
time trying to mitigate the frequently inflamed passions of the 
Japanese at Davao in order to try to head off anticipated outraged 
reactions among the general public of the Islands. In addition, 
these officials were simultaneously attempting to provide that 
same public with rationales for acts of Japanese aggression, acts 
which the Consulate General ordinarily learned about after the 
fact through the press.186 Therefore, the parallel interests of the 
Quezon regime and of the Japanese consular corps tended to 
bring the two closer together and to sustain a felicitous climate 
of Japanese-Philippine relations despite the increasing tensions 
which characterized Japanese-American affairs. 
Davao: On an Even Keel 
From mid-1936 through the spring of 1939, the persistent 
and careful actions of both the Philippine and Japanese govern-
ments to ease the Davao situation continued to bear fruit. Al-
though during those years there were a number of developments 
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which affected the Japanese settlement in Davao, none of them 
proved detrimental. In fact, certain events contributed impor-
tantly to the relative stabilization of Japanese-Philippine rela-
tions. 
In this latter regard, one of the most significant occurrences 
was the passage by the National Assembly of a new public land 
law (Commonwealth Act No. 141, approved November 7, 1936) 
which was to replace the collectanea of the frequently amended 
public land law of 1919. While this bill was being discussed in 
committee, Pedro Sabido, who was himself a member of the 
Assembly's Committee on Public Lands, kept in close touch 
with the Japanese consulate, which was naturally concerned. It 
was Sabido's view that the proposed revisions contained in the 
new law were simply to try to bring the legislation covering 
public lands more into conformity with the Constitution and 
that there was no special connection between the new law and 
the Davao situation. 
However, Sabido did express his concern to Consul General 
Uchiyama that in going over possible revisions, committee mem-
bers were being given an opportunity to "play with all sorts of 
words and phrases" which might open up the whole Pandora's 
box of leased lands. Therefore, it was Sabido's opinion that 
Japanese pressure should be focused on the prevention of the re-
opening of the question of the pakiaw system's legality.187 This 
was, according to Sabido, especially important because Secretary 
of Agriculture and Commerce Rodriguez had long since said 
that the pakiaw system was illegal. Although, as a result of the 
tactics of President Quezon, a certain ambiguity still surrounded 
Rodriguez's interpretation, if the issue ever came before the As-
sembly directly, Sabido was sure that the Assembly would sup-
port the Secretary.188 Thus, when the new public land law was 
passed, while Article 40 dealt with the limitations on the trans-
fer of the rights of leaseholders of public lands, the pakiaw system 
as such was not specifically mentioned. 
Moreover, as Sabido had always advised and Consul General 
Uchiyama had agreed, the Davao situation continued to be 
handled by the executive branch of the Philippine government; 
78 
of major concern to the Japanese was the identity of the individ-
ual officials who held key positions affecting Davao. The person-
ality who continued to be looked upon by the consulate as their 
principal ' "adversary" was, of course, Secretary Rodriguez. In 
January of 1937, Assemblyman Benigno S. Aquino secretly con-
fided to Morokuma that President Quezon intended to designate 
Vice President Osmena to head the Philippine side of the 
Joint Philippine-American Preparatory Commission on Philip-
pine Affairs and that Osmena would resign as Secretary of Edu-
cation to fill the new post.189 Significantly, according to Aquino, 
when Osmena resigned, the then Secretary of the Interior 
Quirino would move over to the Department of Education, and 
Secretary Rodriguez would be appointed as Secretary of the In-
terior, leaving a vacancy in the Secretaryship of Agriculture and 
Commerce. Aquino believed that he himself was the leading can-
didate for the latter position. Moreover, Aquino said that he had 
consulted with both Osmena and Roxas who were supporting his 
candidacy. Upon receiving this news from Morokuma, Consul 
General Uchiyama reported to the Foreign Office that "in view of 
his attitude toward Japan," if the appointment of Aquino went 
through, "I think we will be in a much more advantageous po-
sition to settle the Davao problem than with Rodriguez. . . ."190 
However, Uchiyama warned that with Rodriguez, as Secretary 
of the Interior, having direct responsibility for the Davao City 
Mayor, the Commissioner of Mindanao, and Sulu, "we can not 
permit ourselves any optimism."191 
Probably unfortunately for the Japanese this rumored shift 
in top government posts did not immediately occur. However, 
one appointment to a key position did seem favorable to Davao 
Consul Shibata Ichitaro. For in April, 1937, former provincial 
Governor of Davao Juan A. Sarenas was appointed Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior. Since Sarenas had for many years had 
a close relationship as a consulting attorney with the Furukawa 
enterprises and with a number of other Japanese firms, Shibata 
surmised that the appointment of Sarenas was being made chiefly 
in order to deal with the problems affecting the Japanese at 
Davao, problems with which Sarenas was well acquainted. 
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Therefore, commented Shibata in a report to Consul General 
Uchiyama in Manila which was passed along to Tokyo, it was 
most important that Sarenas be "brought over" to the side of 
the Japanese and kept there.192 
Among key figures in the legislative branch of the Common-
wealth government, in addition to Sabido, in regard to matters 
concerning Davao the Japanese were perhaps closest to the As-
semblyman from Davao, Romualdo Quimpo, who had also acted 
as an attorney for several Japanese firms. On the night of Aug-
ust 3, 1937, Quimpo held a long conversation with Vice Consul 
Kihara.193 Quimpo, who was about to leave for Hong Kong as 
a member of a legislative welcoming committee to meet Presi-
dent Quezon, who was en route home from Washington, dis-
cussed various aspects of the still pending Davao question. 
Assemblyman Quimpo said that, if he were asked about Davao, 
he intended to reply that any expulsion of the Japanese would 
lead to the destruction of the local economy and that therefore 
it would be to the benefit of both Japan and the Philippines to 
maintain the status quo. Moreover, Quimpo told Kihara that 
he would advise the President that the latter's efforts had greatly 
reduced the tensions over Davao and that to permit the matter 
to be raised before the Assembly for discussion and debate would 
only arouse dissension anew. Thus, Quimpo continued, he in-
tended to urge Quezon to work for an understanding at the 
executive level between Japan and the Philippines, in particular 
the terms under which the original pakiaw contracts might be 
renewed.194 
Also, according to what Quimpo relayed to Kihara, several 
members of the Assembly had asked his opinion of a possible 
purchase of the land held by the Japanese in Davao. Quimpo 
recounted that he had replied that, while such a purchase might 
hypothetically be possible and thus the Japanese would be ex-
pelled, the result would undoubtedly be the ruin of the abaca 
plantations and a very serious blow to the Philippine economy.195 
Nevertheless, such a proposal was made in November of 1937, 
by Assemblyman Augustin Kintanar of Cebu, who had been a 
member of the party which had accompanied the President on 
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his journey to Davao in April, 1936. The Kintanar plan was to 
have the Philippine government buy up all Japanese holdings 
in Mindanao and resell them at cost in ten hectare lots to Fili-
pino citizens. Assemblyman Kintanar said that he had long since 
recognized the tremendous cost of such a proposal and that that 
was why he had waited until the fall of 1937 to introduce his 
bill. However, said Kintanar, now that the insular treasury had 
in it some PI00,000,000 derived from the refunded United 
States coconut oil excise tax, in addition to an anticipated annual 
income of some P50,000,000 from the same source and from 
other similar excise taxes,196 the government could well afford 
to set aside $40,000,000 as a negotiating fund. T h e Assembly-
man added that in his opinion the government ought to move 
quickly because the longer they waited the more the purchase 
was likely to cost. 
Sadly this latest in the series of proposed monetary solutions 
of the Davao question met the same fate as its predecessors. Nor 
was it to be the last such, for in March, 1938, another bill intro-
duced into the National Assembly again recommended tapping 
the coconut oil tax refund to purchase Japanese landholdings; 
but, as Mr. Kintanar had predicted, the ante was now raised, 
and the new proposal called for a P50,000,000 appropriation. 
Once more, however, the Japanese failed to evidence any in-
terest in the sale of their holdings, and neither the government 
nor the Assembly pushed the issue any further.197 
Meanwhile, the apparent continuing desire of both the 
American and Philippine governments to minimize the Davao 
problem was evident in an exchange of memoranda that took 
place in the fall of 1938, between the office of President Quezon 
and Brigadier Charles Burnett, Chief of the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs.198 Both documents were headed identically "The Davao 
Land Problem!' In the memorandum from the office of the 
President to General Burnett, dated October 29, 1938, it was 
reported that, according to the Secretary of Agriculture and 
Commerce, Japanese landholdings in Davao then amounted to 
63,765 hectares, of which 29,602 hectares were estimated to 
have been acquired legally under Public Land Acts 926, 2921, 
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and 2975. The remaining 34,163 hectares were all lands being 
utilized by Japanese through either verbal or written agree-
ments with Filipinos, and many of those agreements were clearly 
in violation of existing laws. However, it was stated that in the 
only four provinces where the Japanese were engaged in agri-
culture to any extent, Davao, Zamboanga (2,632 hectares), 
Cotabato (112 hectares), and Palawan (74 hectares), their hold-
ings aggregated 66,584 hectares, which, out of a four province 
total area of 7,529,820 hectares, was "relatively insignificant/' 
In Davao Province there were said to be only about 14,000 
Japanese, and there had been no signs of any unusual or rapid 
increase. The memorandum concluded: 
Indeed the matter would not give much concern were it not for the 
fact that in Davao, the landholdings of the Japanese, said to be of the 
choicest lands in the province, enable them to control the business in 
practically all fields. It has been reported that goods sold in Davao are 
90% Japanese, that the Filipino farm labor has been completely over-
shadowed. This is the situation that has caused alarm.199 
The reverse memorandum from General Burnett to Presi-
dent Quezon was dated November 11, 1938,200 and was a sum-
mary of some of the impressions formed by the General after 
a recent personal visit to Davao.201 He began with an account of 
a discussion he had had in Davao with certain leaders of the 
Japanese community: "Some apprehension was expressed by 
the Japanese Consul and Japanese businessmen over the possi-
bility of the cancellation of Japanese leases by the Common-
wealth Government. However, the Japanese Consul was con-
fident that no action prejudicial to Japanese interests would be 
taken while President Quezon remained in office/' 
According to General Burnett, the Japanese Consul had also 
told him that the crux of the so-called problem at Davao was the 
pakiaw system, which the Consul said affected 70% of the land 
controlled by Japanese and which was probably legal. This left 
only about 8,000 hectares of Japanese-tilled lands which might 
be considered questionable, an amount which in the view of 
General Burnett was very small considering the vast expanse of 
Davao Province. There was, wrote the General, no difference 
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whatever between the soil cultivated by the Japanese and the 
thousands of hectares of soil lying fallow, and therefore the de-
velopment of the former was due entirely to the efforts of the 
Japanese over the previous thirty years. General Burnett con-
cluded his memorandum as follows: 
If a neutral but friendly observer might be permitted to offer a suggestion 
as to the settlement of this question, it would be to allow the status quo 
to continue until the expiration of these leases which the legal branch 
of the Government considers illegal, and then require a legal contract of 
the share cropper type to be made between the owner and the Japanese 
who works his land. The area of land involved is so insignificant that it 
would seem most unwise, for diplomatic as well as other reasons, to mag-
nify the question into a "Problem." On the whole it would be rather 
easy to show that the existence of the present Japanese holdings as 
well as Japanese labor in Davao is a distinct asset and not a liability, to 
the Commonwealth Government.202 
In late November of 1938, an important personnel change in 
the Commonwealth administration, one which the Japanese 
had heard rumors of for nearly two years, finally took place. 
Benigno S. Aquino replaced Eulogio Rodriguez as Secretary of 
Agriculture and Commerce. Shortly before the appointment 
was made by President Quezon, Acting Consul General Kihara 
told the Foreign Office that, "If [Rafael S.] Alunan is named 
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, it can be considered 
disadvantageous to us since he is the head of the pro-American 
faction and has a plan for the development of Mindanao. 
Aquino who has ties with us has been suggesting to Laurel and 
Sabido for the past several days that he be named to the post. 
According to Sabido, the President intends to name Alunan 
Secretary of the Interior and Aquino is almost certain to be 
named Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in a few days."208 
Within a week both of the appointments reported in ad-
vance by Sabido were made, and the Japanese Acting Consul 
General was extremely pleased. Kihara wrote that Aquino was 
very different from Rodriguez and was much more understand-
ing of the Japanese position at Davao. Of special pleasure to 
Kihara was the fact that he had direct access to Aquino, some-
thing that had never been easy with Rodriguez, and that Aquino 
was quick to take measures suggested by the consulate.204 There-
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fore, since it was thought by the Japanese that the appointment 
of Aquino represented a significant gesture to them by Quezon, 
the Davao question became correspondingly even less of an ir-
ritant to the generally smooth course of Japanese-Philippine 
relations. 
As early as March 4, Acting Consul General Kihara was able 
to report to the Foreign Office that he had had a very satisfactory 
meeting with the new Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce 
Aquino. Aquino had agreed to permit Japanese 25-year lease-
holders to renew all expiring leases, and he urged Kihara to tell 
them secretly that this would be done. According to Aquino, 
the expiring leases of Filipino leaseholders would be returned 
to the government, but the government would then arrange new 
leases directly with the Japanese farmers. Finally Aquino re-
quested that Kihara keep the substance of his remarks completely 
in confidence but that he advise the Japanese in Davao to avoid 
scrupulously any untoward incidents which might in turn arouse 
public reaction to the extent that Aquino would be prevented 
from putting his plans into effect.205 Nevertheless, as United 
States-Japanese relations worsened, the Americans, who con-
tinued to bear the responsibility for Philippine defense, seemed 
to demonstrate a growing concern over the Japanese settlement 
at Davao. For example, in a lengthy memorandum submitted 
by General Burnett to the Secretary of War in January, 1939, 
on the subject "Japanese Penetration of the Philippine 
Islands,"206 while terming his statements an "educated guess," 
and after again praising the Japanese undertaking at Davao as 
an outstanding example of Japanese thrift and enterprise, the 
General wrote that the Davao land problem posed a very perilous 
post-independence issue which might well pit a strong power 
against a weak power. The question then would be, as General 
Burnett viewed it, whether Japan would behave in the Philip-
pines as she had in Manchuria and China, and the General's 
conclusion was that, if in the opinion of the Japanese leadership 
political domination became necessary for economic domina-
tion, it seemed to him most probable that the required steps 
would be taken to secure that end. 
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Perhaps in line with such concerns, then Philippine Com-
monwealth Secretary of Finance Manuel Roxas was reported to 
be considering again a plan to close the port of Davao to foreign 
shipping. Ostensibly the proposal was, as the previous one had 
been, for the intended benefit of local shipping interests and 
would mean that all imports and exports at Davao would have 
to be transported to other ports. Practically speaking, however, 
since the Davao carrying trade was almost entirely in the hands 
of the Japanese, such a move would necessarily have an im-
mediate detrimental effect on Japanese interests, whether to the 
advantage of Philippine shippers or not. Thus, Acting Consul 
General Kihara Jitaro voiced his strong opposition to the plan, 
describing it as generally retrogressive and as a certain hindrance 
not only to overseas Philippine commerce but to the possible 
industrial development of Mindanao.207 
Once more, apparently in the face of such diplomatic pres-
sures, no action was taken to close the port of Davao. In fact, 
certain leading public figures made efforts to allay any fears 
which the Philippine public might have about Japanese in-
terests in Davao. For example, in an interview given prominence 
in the pro-administration Herald, Assemblyman Jose Romero 
was quoted as saying that the land holdings of the Japanese in 
Davao were "not alarming," since they were only some 60,000 
hectares out of a total of about 1,000,000 hectares in the 
province.208 The Japanese, according to Romero, could con-
tinue to possess the lands which they then held, but they could 
not acquire additional land because of the provisions of the Com-
monwealth Constitution. He also said that he did not believe 
the government would go to the extent of seeking the expul-
sion of Japanese farmers from lands which a former Secretary 
of Agriculture and Commerce had alleged were acquired il-
legally.209 
That the Japanese too were feeling far more secure about 
their holdings in Davao was evident in a report from Davao 
Consul Iwanaga Hiraku to the Foreign Office in April, 1939, 
after a visit to Davao by Secretaries Alunan (Interior) and 
Aquino (Agriculture and Commerce). Consul Iwanaga wrote 
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that, after the two men had briefly inspected the Ohta and Furu-
kawa plantations and the Japanese sponsored agricultural ex-
periment station, they attended a dinner given by the Consul 
and demonstrated a very friendly attitude toward the Jap-
anese.210 On April 2, Secretary Aquino attended a luncheon 
given by the newly elected Assemblyman from Davao, Cesar M. 
Sotto. Aquino, in his speech at that luncheon attended by 25 
Filipinos, several Japanese including Consul Iwanaga, and two 
or three Americans, said that Filipinos as Asians must maintain 
and increase friendly relations with the various countries of the 
Far East. He also stated that Filipinos welcomed foreign capital 
and foreigners themselves into the Philippines but that Philip-
pine laws must be strictly observed. Moreover, Aquino em-
phasized his opinion that for anyone to say that foreigners living 
in Davao were a threat to the Philippines was "some kind of 
fantasy/'211 Iwanaga was also encouraged by the confidential 
comment of Assemblyman Sotto that Secretary Alunan, who had 
in the past shown a certain prejudice against the Japanese in 
Davao, had said that on the basis of the present inspection trip 
he fully realized the contributions the Japanese were making to 
the development of products in the islands and would so inform 
the President.212 
The A lexander Resolution 
In May, 1939, the happy quiescence of the Davao problem 
over the preceding three years was rudely shattered. A bomb-
shell of sorts was tossed into the lap of the Commonwealth gov-
ernment when Representative John G. Alexander, Republican 
of Minnesota, introduced into the United States House of 
Representatives a resolution demanding an investigation of 
Philippine-Japanese relations. The text of the Alexander reso-
lution was as follows: 
Whereas the people of the United States have a total investment in 
the Philippine Islands of $140,000,000 of which $45,000,000 is invested 
in Philippine Government Bonds guaranteed by the United States Gov-
ernment and $95,000,000 is invested in commercial ventures; and $700,-
000,000 by the Government of the United States; and 
Whereas each year more and more Japanese people and businesses 
are moving into the Philippines; and 
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Whereas certain Philippine public officials have leased large sections 
of land in Davao province to Japanese persons and companies; and 
Whereas wives of certain Philippine public officials have leased ship-
ping interests to Japanese persons and companies; and 
Whereas certain members of the National Assembly of the Philip-
pines and former members of the Philippine legislature have sold and 
leased lands and properties of Japanese persons and companies; and 
Whereas many members of the National Assembly of the Philippine 
legislature have been accused of having been bribed by Japanese persons 
and companies; and 
Whereas President Quezon and other certain Philippine public of-
ficials have attempted to inject a pro-Japanese attitude and spirit into 
the Philippine people in an attempt to disrupt the harmonious relations 
between the Philippines and the United States; and 
Whereas a bill has been introduced and is now pending in the Na-
tional Assembly of the Philippines, the purpose of which is to amend the 
existing immigration laws of the Philippines so as to relax regulations 
regarding Japanese immigration to the Philippines; 
Whereas President Quezon of the Philippines has repeatedly ap-
pointed to high public office Japanese-minded persons; and 
Whereas certain sources and amounts of President Quezon's income 
are allegedly unknown and unaccounted for; and 
Whereas under the administration of President Quezon the freedom 
of speech and press has been impaired and the use of the mails denied 
persons in transmitting unfavorable information regarding the policies 
of President Quezon; and 
Whereas the legal rights of the United States government and of the 
citizens of the United States and of the Philippines have been invaded 
by the Government and officials of the Philippines; Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the House of Representatives that for the purpose of 
obtaining information necessary as a basis for legislation, the Speaker 
shall appoint a special committee of six members with power to issue 
subpoenas, to investigate the aforesaid matters and to ascertain the ad-
visability of more definitely determining our immediate and our future 
relations with the Islands. The chairman of the committee or any mem-
ber thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. Every person who, having 
been summoned as a witness by authority of said committee or any sub-
committee thereof, willfully makes default, or who having appeared re-
fuses to answer any questions pertinent to the matter herein authorized, 
shall be held to the penalties provided by section 102 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, as amended (U.S.C. 1934 edition, title 2, 
sec. 102). 
And be it further resolved that said committee be allowed $100,000 
to carry on said investigation. 
The committee shall report to the House as soon as practicable the 
results of its investigation, together with such recommendations for 
remedial measures or for legislation as it deems desirable.213 
Clearly the resolution had no chance of passage whatever but 
had been introduced by Congressman Alexander in order to at-
tract attention to a situation on which he wished to focus public 
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concern. Nevertheless, an outburst of indignation character-
ized the violent reaction of President Quezon and his adminis-
tration. 
Immediately two points seem to be worthy of some investi-
gation: namely, why did Congressman Alexander make these 
charges, and was there any validity to them? Mr. Alexander 
himself in answering the first question states: 
My interest in Philippine affairs was the result of 20 years of study, 
beginning at the close of World War I, of the probability of another 
World War, and the factors leading to the outbreak of same. It was my 
theory, based on the need for Japanese industrial expansion and their 
action in Manchuria and China, and their penetration of the East Indies 
and the Philippines, that they were about ready to make an attempt to 
grab the entire area. This was made especially apparent from the fact 
that there was a considerable movement in this country to pull our mili-
tary forces out of the Orient.214 
The Quezon administration obviously had a very different 
interpretation of Rep. Alexander's motives. They made their 
views known through the pro-administration Herald in an edi-
torial entitled "Are We Pro-Japanese." 
Minnesota, which is the Congressman's own state, is part of the dairy 
bloc. The dairy bloc is part of the group opposed to the Philippine bill 
now pending in Congress. This opposition is based on the belief that 
Philippine coconut oil, some of which is converted into butter and fat 
substitutes, is harmful to the American dairy industry. Opponents of 
the bill can attack it either frontally or insidiously. A frontal attack is 
successful only with facts for ammunition. When there are no very valid 
arguments in one's arsenal, the underhanded, illicit attack is the only 
tenable method.215 
Indeed the Joint Preparatory Commission on Philippine Af-
fairs had submitted its reports, and the American Congress had 
before it an administration-sponsored bill proposing amendments 
to the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This proposal sought to substi-
tute declining duty-free quotas for gradually increasing export 
taxes on Philippine shipments to the United States, a proposal 
which was calculated to reduce gradually the import volume of 
such commodities as coconut oil but which would continue to 
permit a profit to be made on the remaining trade. Naturally 
this was a bill strongly favored by President Quezon and his 
government; and thus it was believed in the Philippines, 
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whether rightly or wrongly, that charges such as those leveled 
by Representative Alexander were indirectly aimed at prevent-
ing its passage. 
If indeed the efforts of Mr. Alexander were a supposed 
smokescreen to shroud his real purpose of aiding Minnesota 
dairy interests, one can only feel the deepest sympathy for the 
Congressman, since the amendments to the Tydings-McDuffie 
Act passed Congress with ease and were signed into law by 
President Roosevelt on Aug. 7, 1939. Moreover, Representa-
tive Alexander was himself defeated for reelection in 1940. In 
his own words, Mr. Alexander says: 
The outcome of the efforts which I made were not too encouraging. 
The people of my own area in this State felt that this was an activity to 
which their member of Congress did not need to give attention. How-
ever, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor many people came to 
me to admit their error and say that they could see now that they had 
been mistaken in criticizing my activities, but of course, by then it was too 
late.216 
Yet another explanation of the Alexander Resolution was 
contained in a dispatch dated May 22, 1939, from Acting Consul 
General Kihara in Manila to Japanese Foreign Minister Arita 
Hachiro. The real culprits, according to Kihara, were the Com-
munists. It was the Communists, he suggested, who had prob-
ably instigated the Alexander Resolution in order to strengthen 
the opposition in the United States to Philippine independence 
and to encourage the bolstering of American military forces in 
the Far East and thus to ''counteract the Japanese policy of the 
Quezon government."217 Kihara maintained that ever since 
July, 1937, the Communists had been leading the anti-Japanese 
movement in the Philippines,218 that they had been propa-
gandizing about Japanese aggression, and that they had con-
sistently criticized and attacked all plans for Philippine-Japanese 
friendship and cooperation. He further contrasted most un-
favorably the Communists' purported position with the strict 
neutrality to which the Commonwealth government had thus 
far adhered. Therefore, Consul Kihara saw the Alexander 
Resolution as a logical culmination of the efforts of "Commu-
nists" to turn the Philippines against Japan.219 
89 
The second point raised earlier was to what extent the bill 
of particulars contained in the Alexander Resolution was valid. 
Again, it seems appropriate to quote the editorial reply of the 
Herald: 
. . . There are only three facts that may give credence to the charge 
that we are pro-Japanese. First of these is the known desire of President 
Quezon to establish friendly relations with our neighbors including 
Japan. We shall have to live with the Japanese and other neighbors in 
this part of the world. Prudence dictates that we befriend them. If this 
is pro-Japanese then let us make the most of it. 
The other facts are the growing Japanese dominance of the retail 
trade, and the unfortunate Japanese control of the economic life of 
Davao. But if this is pro-Japanism, then the American government is 
more at fault than the Philippine Commonwealth. The entry of Jap-
anese goods and immigrants had its highest peak during the Jones law 
regime. Most of the Davao landholdings of the Japanese were acquired 
under the noses of American Governors General. 
With respect to the possibility that some Filipino citizens, including 
officials or their wives, have been acting as dummies for Japanese in-
vestors or corporations, it will suffice to mention that the Department of 
Justice has for some time been investigating reports with a view to pros-
ecuting those that might have violated the strict laws regulating the 
participation of aliens in Philippine natural resources. We do not need 
a congressional investigation to remind us to enforce our laws. 
The Commonwealth Government is doing what it can to liquidate 
the unfortunate situation inherited from the American Governors Gen-
eral. But even in this task, it is somewhat handicapped. To America, 
Japan comes under the label of foreign affairs, and the State Department 
has repeatedly shown lack of sympathy for most of the attempts in 
Manila to inquire into Japanese landholdings, understandably because 
any new irritation in American-Japanese relations can always have reper-
cussions. The only weapons available to the Philippines, furthermore, are 
the tariff and immigration laws, and the Philippines is not in full posses-
sion of them. Legislation on these subjects have still to be approved in 
Washington.220 
Certainly the most persuasive argument made in the pre-
ceding editorial was that the American colonial administration 
and subsequently the State Department under the Common-
wealth regime had consistently followed a policy of extreme 
caution with regard to Japanese interests in the Philippines. 
The failure of the United States government to take a stronger 
stand in behalf of the actions proposed by Secretary Rodriguez, 
for example, had at least in part contributed to the reluctance 
of the Commonwealth administration to act more forcefully on 
its own in Davao. It was also true, of course, that the original 
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influx of Japanese immigrants into the Islands had been officially 
encouraged by the American authorities in order to provide 
labor for the Baguio road project and later for American-owned 
plantations in the Davao region. Another telling point in the 
Quezon government's defense against the Alexander charges 
was the statement that with independence only a very few years 
away, ' 'prudence" dictated that the Philippines exert its efforts 
to establish friendly relations with the Japanese. The harsh 
realities of international life certainly had made it highly inad-
visable for a weak Philippines about to embark on a perilous 
and lonely voyage to antagonize a powerful Japan. 
Perhaps the least impressive contention of the Herald edi-
torial was the bland assertion that the Department of Justice 
was "investigating reports" that Filipino citizens, including 
government officials or their wives, might have been acting as 
dummies. Information on this particular phase of Japanese 
operations in the Philippines had been available for years, and 
the close ties between influential Filipinos and Japanese busi-
nessmen were widely known. In fact, it was this particular as-
pect of Representative Alexander's accusations that received the 
most support in the Islands, although the bulk of that support 
came from Filipino liberals or radicals of diverse political color-
ations, who were perhaps less concerned with the danger of 
Japanese penetration than they were with stirring up opposition 
to the Quezon administration and its caciquist supporters. 
For example, Congressman Alexander had reprinted in the 
Congressional Record a letter to him signed by Luis Agudo, 
Secretary of the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, or Popular Front, in which 
Agudo praised the Congressman for his proposed investigation 
and said that Japanese infiltration had reached a "serious pro-
portion" with a number of public officials involved in the selling 
or leasing of lands to the Japanese.221 Similarly Vicente Sotto in 
his anti-Quezon publication Union wrote an article entitled 
"Congressman Alexander's Charges Are not Groundless," in 
which he termed the legislator's conclusions "exaggerated," but 
nevertheless suggested that there was sufficient basis for his 
charges. Sotto referred to the list of government officials impli-
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cated in the earlier Rodriguez investigation, the denunciation 
by then Governor Garcia of Bohol of public officials including 
members of the National Assembly who were acting as dummies 
for Japanese lumber concessionaires, and the Filipino men and 
women who lent their names to Japanese fishing boats, mineral 
concessions, or pasture land leases.222 
At any rate, the opening salvos had been fired, and the verbal 
battle between Representative Alexander in Washington and 
the Quezon administration in Manila was on. On May 23, on 
the floor of Congress, Alexander charged that President Quezon 
was attempting to establish a dictatorship in the islands, an accu-
sation that incidentally was by no means new and had been made 
repeatedly by opponents of Quezon in the Philippines as well. 
Alexander also claimed that Quezon was trying to have the Con-
stitution amended so as to able to succeed himself, a develop-
ment which, despite the most vociferous denials at the time, was 
to become a reality in amendments to the Philippine Constitu-
tion approved by President Roosevelt on December 2, 1940, 
and under which President Quezon was indeed reelected in 
1941. Morover, Congressman Alexander broadened his attack 
to include Vice President Sergio Osmena for having made sev-
eral trips to Japan and for having been "instrumental in the 
sale of land to Japanese/'223 Coincidentally Osmena happened 
to be in Washington as head of the Philippine mission, working 
for the passage of the amendments to the Tydings-McDuffie Act. 
Meanwhile, in the Philippines the Quezon administration 
was defended by Governor Pacifico Sobrecarey of Davao, who 
said he had made a study of the so-called Davao problem and had 
found that no Filipino official was involved in any Japanese 
land lease as alleged by Representative Alexander. If anyone 
were at fault in leases to Japanese of public lands, said Sobre-
carey, it was clearly the Americans, since the leases under fire 
were all negotiated in the era of the American Governors Gen-
eral. Sobrecarey noted that neither the former legislature nor 
the present National Assembly under the Commonwealth had 
amended the public land laws to permit the Japanese to pur-
chase or to lease public lands. According to the Davao Governor 
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the whole issue was ridiculous anyway since the total area leased 
to the Japanese covered only 19,976 hectares.224 
On June 12, Representative Alexander resumed his offensive 
with an allegation that Japan had gained control of a number of 
important island industries such as lumber, fishing, and hemp 
through an "economic invasion'' of the Philippines which Presi-
dent Quezon had done nothing to check. Said Alexander, "Sur-
prising is the attitude of the dictatorial president . . . that even 
at the height of his popularity he is described by some of his 
countrymen as having cold feet . . . . T o all intents and pur-
poses, Davao is as much Japanese territory as Manchukuo. , , The 
Japanese, charged Alexander, had illegally gained control of 
170,000 acres of agricultural land and many more acres of timber 
land. He said, "In Davao the Japanese are practically running 
an independent state," and he blamed "crooked governmental 
officials, lawyers and ignorant natives. , , He added: 
Filipino authorities are afraid to do anything about the steady flow of 
short, wiry, hardy astute yellow men into what has proudly been called 
in the Philippine Commonwealth constitution "the patrimony of the 
nation." They are resigned to the coming of the Japanese. They admit 
frankly that they can not afford to make an unfriendly gesture toward 
their invading neighbors. "Tomorrow they may be our masters" they 
say in a matter-of-fact way.225 
The major effort of President Quezon to reply in detail and 
to try to refute the accusations of Representative Alexander 
came in a speech to the people of Davao on June 28, 1939, on 
the occasion of a trip by Quezon to lay the cornerstone of a barrio 
obrero at Piapi, Davao. His words are here reproduced ver-
batim: 
Now,—lastly Davao has been prominently mentioned in the news-
papers for the last number of years. It has been prominent in the news-
papers of Manila and much more prominent in the newspapers of 
America. Recently, a member of the Congress of the United States who, 
by the way, is not one of the prominent leaders of Congress, has been 
speaking a lot about the situation in Davao. He has accused me of pro-
tecting the Japanese and tolerating their illegal transactions here. You 
the people of Davao know that when I became President of the Philip-
pines, the lands that are now occupied by the Japanese, the land that they 
claim to be theirs, was already in their possession. The residents of Davao 
know that the question of the Japanese Colony in Davao took place 
under the American administration; that the man who brought Ohta to 
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Davao was Carpenter; that it was Governor Forbes who sympathized 
with the policy of developing Mindanao even with the help of foreigners. 
The situation created in Davao has been created not only under the 
American flag but by American administrators. It is not only unfair, it 
is worse than that, for an American representative in Congress to be ac-
cusing now the Filipino officials for something his countrymen have done 
before. I am not criticizing what ex-Governor Carpenter and what ex-
Governor Forbes have done. I am not condemning them, but if it were 
true what Congressman Alexander says that because of the development 
of Davao by the Japanese the Philippines has been turned over to Japan, 
then it is the fault of ex-Governor Carpenter, ex-Governor Forbes and 
other American officials that Davao has been turned over to Japan, and 
not any Filipino official. 
Now, my countrymen, I am not going to pay more attention to that 
nonsensical and absurd speech of Congressman Alexander. I am going 
to tell you that we are facing a practical question in Davao. Many of 
these plantations are admittedly legal. Some of these plantations, it is 
alleged, have not been acquired legally by them. If it were true that 
some of these plantations have been acquired illegally by the Japanese, 
it is the fault of the Filipinos in Davao who allowed themselves to be 
used by the Japanese. And, moreover, if it was true that some of these 
plantations are illegally in the hands of the Japanese, it will be almost 
impossible for the government to prove that it is illegally in the hands 
of the Japanese because the Filipinos who have allowed themselves to be 
used by the Japanese will testify in favor of the transaction and make it 
legal when tried before the court. What would have been the result if 
I had ordered proceedings in these cases? It would have created a lot of 
trouble; it would have arisen antagonism on the part of the Japanese; 
and perhaps we would have lost the cases in the courts. 
This is a purely practical question of administration. After all, how 
many thousands of hectares are in the hands of the Japanese legally or 
illegally? Nobody claims that they have more than twenty-five thousand 
hectares. How many thousands of hectares do you think you have in 
Davao? You have over one million hectares there. Well, my goodness, 
unless a man is crazy, he cannot say that the Japanese own Davao because 
they have forty-five thousand hectares when we have over a million hec-
tares here that can be the land of the Philippines. Now, no government 
can save a country when the people of that country do not want to be 
saved. It makes no difference whether under our Constitution the right 
to own public land is limited to Filipino citizens. As long as there are 
Filipinos who are willing to sell their rights, the Constitution cannot do 
anything. The possession by the Japanese of these forty-five thousand 
has done you no harm so far. They have developed these lands that were 
undeveloped before. They have taught us how to have a modern planta-
tion of abaca. They have brought here that ramie and I am planting 
ramie now in my hacienda in Arayat because we have learned from the 
Japanese here in Davao. If the Filipinos should take advantage of what 
we can learn from what the Japanese is doing here, the coming of the 
Japanese to Davao, instead of being an evil, it would be a blessing for the 
Filipino. The Japanese are complying with the duties of a foreigner re-
siding in a foreign country. So far, so far, I say it again, the Japanese 
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have not done harm to the Philippines. It is our duty to treat them fairly 
and we have the right to expect from them obedience for our laws. If the 
Filipinos in Davao or in other parts of the country should prove them-
selves Filipinos and will not sell their rights, we have the Constitution 
that protects the permanent interests of the country and we have a gov-
ernment that is sworn to carry out the provisions of that Constitution. 
The Philippines' future is safe, but if the Filipinos have more love for 
money than for their country, nobody can save the Philippines—let us all 
go to hell. (Laughter and applause)226 
The very next day the Herald, after praising the brilliant 
address of the President at Davao, took up the cudgels editorially 
and set out after Representative Alexander again: 
Congressman Alexander has accused the Philippine administration of 
pro-Japanism largely on the basis of the Davao Japanese problem. To 
say the least, this is hardly fair. Not only has the problem been inherited 
but its solution may not be entirely in the hands of the Commonwealth. 
The foreign affairs of the Philippines are still under the supervision of 
the Washington State Department, and Tokyo may have to have a hand 
in the proper solution of the Davao Japanese problem. Congressman 
Alexander might try to ascertain whether or not he has been barking at 
the wrong tree. 
There still remains the question of whether or not there is a Jap-
anese problem to solve. Some observers are of the opinion that there is 
such a serious problem, others are convinced that there is none. Cer-
tainly the excessive acquisition of property and control of communities, 
commerce, and the means of transportation and communication by 
foreign nationals may constitute a problem. On the other hand, every 
nation harbors foreign communities apparently without suffering any 
serious consequences. The Alexanders, before jumping at conclusions, 
might first do a little limbering up by way of getting the pertinent facts.227 
T h e overwhelming passage by the United States Congress of 
the amendments to the Tydings-McDufHe Act seemed to bring 
an end to the efforts of Representative Alexander to ferret out 
Japanese ''subversion'' in the Philippines. Apparently Presi-
dent Quezon too felt that his most recent Davao journey and his 
remarks on that occasion had once more becalmed a potentially 
turbulent situation. For in an interview with a Japanese jour-
nalist, the text of which was published in 1940, the Philippine 
President could say, "The Davao problem gave us a great deal 
of concern at the time, but fortunately at present the whole 
question has disappeared not leaving even a trace of the trouble. 
No one takes up the subject again."228 
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Danger A head: Provincial Politics 
However, a storm in the teacup of Davao provincial politics 
in 1939 threatened to undo all of the earnest behind-the-scenes 
efforts of both Quezon and the Japanese consular authorities 
to minimize the controversial aspects of the Japanese settlement 
at Davao. While the Japanese were probably not overly sur-
prised at these developments since they had had thorough ex-
posure to Philippine politics both at the national and local 
levels, as the Foreign Office archives reveal, they were more than 
ordinarily concerned. And the roots of their concern stemmed 
both from the realities of the depth of their involvement in 
Davao provincial politics as well as from their immediate desire 
to keep the Davao issue out of the limelight of national attention. 
Moreover, since once again as in the Pelayo situation a few years 
earlier, a bitter feud between Filipino personalities and factions 
was the source of the difficulty, the Japanese had legitimate 
cause to be disturbed. 
In the general election of 1938, there had been a very hard 
fought and extremely close three-way race for the post of As-
semblyman from the province of Davao. Cesar M. Sotto had 
won the election by a very slim margin over both the incumbent 
and official administration candidate Romualdo C. Quimpo, 
and former Governor Juan E. Sarenas, who finished third.229 
After his defeat Quimpo was appointed as a technical assistant 
to the President detailed to the Department of the Interior, 
where he assumed the role of private secretary to the Secretary 
of the Interior himself. Since the election had been so bitterly 
contested and since the personal rivalry between Sotto and 
Quimpo was so profound, each man seemed determined to utilize 
his new position to secure revenge against the other. 
After his victory Sotto had affiliated himself with the govern-
ing Nacionalista Party and was so designated on the rolls of the 
Assembly. However, Quimpo, apparently still smarting from 
the effects of his loss, seemed determined to utilize his new ap-
pointment to block every action which Assemblyman Sotto in-
tended to take on behalf of his constituents in Davao. Faced with 
this most distasteful dilemma Sotto resorted to one of the older 
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but more reliable tricks in the bag of the Davao politician, 
namely, the filing of a bill of administrative charges against 
Quimpo, alleging anomalies during his previous incumbency, 
including "corruption by foreigners/' and specifying that 
Quimpo had taken money from the Japanese Association of 
Davao. 
As soon as this controversy became known, Acting Consul 
General Kihara and Davao Consul Iwanaga were of course 
extremely eager to bring it to a conclusion as rapidly as possible. 
Logically they preferred not to have the role of the Japanese in 
Davao politics placed under close public scrutiny. Even more 
disturbing, however, was the possibility that any prolonged dis-
pute between the two Filipino politicians might rake up all of 
the quietly smoldering coals of the Davao land question again. 
Kihara reported to the Foreign Office that he had tried var-
ious means of mediating the dispute and had consulted Moro-
kuma, who had in turn approached Assemblyman Sotto both 
directly and indirectly without success.230 Moreover, since Ki-
hara viewed the whole affair as "very dangerous" vis-a-vis Jap-
anese interests and felt that whatever proposals for mediation 
were made by himself might become political footballs in the 
next election, he thought it would be far safer for some Filipino 
personality such as the Davao attorney and politician Rafael 
Castillo to act as mediator.231 Kihara also advised Davao Consul 
Iwanaga that, if mediation should not be possible and an investi-
gation of the charges should in fact be made, Quimpo and his 
faction did not want the account books of the Japanese Associa-
tion to be made public for fear of exposing Laurel and Sabido. 
Therefore, the Acting Consul General suggested that the Asso-
ciation might state that the records of payments made through 
1938 were entirely unclear since the man who made such pay-
ments, Murakami, was now deceased.232 
On September 24, 1939, Kihara managed to arrange a meet-
ing between himself and Assemblyman Sotto. Kihara told Sotto 
that although he did not want to get into the dispute between 
the two men, Quimpo in truth never had had any relations with 
the Japanese Association, and, if Sotto persisted in his present 
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course, he would only stir up the Davao land problem contrary 
to the wishes of President Quezon and possibly create a crisis in 
Japanese-Philippine affairs.233 Sotto replied confidentially to 
Kihara that while the heart of his charges against Quimpo was 
the latter's corrupt practices, since proof was very hard to obtain 
and he did not want to revive the land question, he "would not 
emphasize this too much/'234 
Of course, what the Japanese found themselves involved in 
once more was a local Philippine political vendetta in which 
they, as the principal economic factor in the province, were both 
the logical target of political attack and the principal potential 
source of political largesse. Thus, while Davao politicos were not 
above venting their spleen on each other via mutual accusations 
of being in the pay of the Japanese, none of these men really 
wanted to do any more than snap at the hand that fed them 
since all of them, in effect, ate out of the same hand. After all, 
Sotto himself intended to run for reelection and obviously did 
not intend to alienate the Davao Japanese though perhaps he 
did intend to frighten them sufficiently so that he could count 
on their financial assistance in the next campaign. 
At any rate, the brief flurry which had already shown signs 
of petering out at the time of the Sotto-Kihara conversation dis-
sipated still further when a month later it was reported that 
Sotto was withdrawing his charge of "corruption by foreigners'' 
from the bill of particulars against Quimpo.235 Ultimately, fol-
lowing a special investigation of Quimpo's affairs by ex-Governor 
Exequiel Santos of Nueva Ecija, President Quezon issued an 
executive order exonerating Quimpo from Sotto's charges saying 
that the accusations against Quimpo had not been proved.236 
Thus, through the combined efforts of the Japanese consular 
staff and the Commonwealth executive plus the canny political 
sensitivities of the politicians of Davao yet another potential 
stimulus to the revival of tensions over the Davao land problem 
was laid to rest. 
A Solution Achieved 
During 1940, while Japanese-American relations worsened, 
both Japanese and Filipinos continued to exercise care and dis-
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cretion in dealing with Davao. In July of 1940, for example, it 
was announced that former Japanese Foreign Minister and fu-
ture Ambassador to the United States Nomura Kichisaburo was 
to make a visit to the Philippines to "inquire after the health/' 
of the Japanese community in Davao.237 When Nomura actually 
reached the Philippines and visited Davao, he laughed uproar-
iously when he was told of the supposed reason for his trip and 
said he had no special interest in "health."238 Nomura referred 
to his visit as purely a personal and private one. He said he had 
no comment on the new immigration legislation which had just 
been enacted by the Philippine Assembly other than to express 
a hope that legitimate Japanese enterprises would in no way be 
hindered. Moreover, Nomura stated that the so-called Asiatic 
Monroe Doctrine set forth by former Foreign Minister Arita 
was based solely on "good neighborliness , , but that Japan had 
no intention of interfering in Philippine affairs.289 Overall No-
mura's appearance at Davao was well received in the Philippines 
largely as a result of the low key of his travel plans and of his 
remarks in the Islands. 
That similar efforts from the Philippine side were being 
made to keep the Davao situation on as even a keel as possible 
was evident the following month when President Quezon too 
traveled to Davao. The purpose of the President's trip was to 
meet High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, who was to be 
present at the opening on September 3, of a new national road 
from Davao through Bukidnon to Cagayan. On the morning 
of the 29th of August, the day of his departure, Quezon met with 
Consul General Yoshida Tanichiro, whom he told: 
For the High Commissioner and myself to head for Davao at the same 
time should be avoided in these times, but, since the circumstances are 
unavoidable, I will arrive at night, spend the night on board ship, land 
early next morning and without stopping a moment in Davao will head 
by automobile directly for Bukidnon. I do not want any special im-
portance to be attached to the occasion nor do I want the Japanese to 
endure any needless anxiety.240 
For the President to go to such extremes to reassure the Japanese 
Consul General verbally and the Japanese community in Davao 
by scrupulously staying out of the city was certainly a diplomatic 
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gesture of the highest order, which could only serve further to 
reinforce the image of Quezon's profound desire for correct and 
friendly relations with Japan. 
In February, 1941, Kihara Jitaro, who had previously served 
in the Philippines as both Vice Consul and Acting Consul Gen-
eral in Manila, was, after an absence of only a year, appointed 
Consul at Davao. On his arrival back in the Islands Kihara was 
asked by the Philippine press about the world situation. He 
said he saw no cause for alarm since Japan had no desire for 
war with the United States, and he explained somewhat poet-
ically that the reason for the return from Davao to Japan of so 
many Japanese and their families was not for "evacuation" pur-
poses as some rashly suggested but rather "to see the cherry blos-
soms in spring."241 However, as the number of Japanese booking 
return passage to the homeland continued to increase, anxious 
Filipino reporters continued to direct their inquiries to the 
Japanese Consulate in Davao. Consul Kihara's secretary now in-
formed the questioners that the women and children were leav-
ing in order to be in Japan in time for the opening of school, ex-
plaining that some schools opened in April, some in May, and 
some in June. He positively denied that there had been any 
official evacuation order from Tokyo.242 
Undoubtedly one consideration in the appointment of Ki-
hara as Davao Consul was his long-standing close personal rela-
tionship with President Quezon. Evidence of the significance of 
this factor was contained in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign 
Office dated April 6, 1941, which reported that the President 
had confided to Kihara that it would pose a serious problem for 
future Japanese-Philippine relations if Quezon were to leave 
office with the Davao land question still unresolved. Since, ac-
cording to Quezon, he himself was the only person in the Philip-
pines with sufficient influence to persuade the public to accept 
a solution that would be mutually agreeable to both Japan and 
the Philippines, he recommended immediate consultations to 
this end be undertaken between Kihara and Secretary of Agri-
culture and Commerce Aquino.243 During the next few months 
these talks continued with President Quezon having made it 
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clear that what disturbed him most in the present situation was 
the role of the Filipino and American leaseholders who were 
subleasing to the Japanese. In mid-September the role of princi-
pal Philippine negotiator was assumed by Secretary of the In-
terior Rafael Alunan, who informed Kihara that if the Japanese 
themselves would rigidly control any further illegal cultivation 
at Davao, the Commonwealth government was prepared to ac-
cept the status quo until 1946, when an independent Philippines 
could enter into direct negotiations with Japan.244 
The Japanese consulate then proceeded to draw up a docu-
ment which embodied the terms of such an agreement and 
showed the memorandum to Alunan without requesting any 
signatures. The Japanese Consul General advised the Foreign 
Office that insistence on signatures would only have complicated 
the procedure, especially since the Philippines was not yet an 
independent state, and formal agreements with the Common-
wealth government were obviously internationally unenforce-
able. However, Consul General Niiro Katsumi stated in his re-
port that he felt confidence in the Filipino leadership since both 
Quezon and Osmena approved of the present settlement.245 
It is perhaps most interesting to note that this agreement was 
reached within the framework of the close personal ties between 
President Quezon and the leaders of the Japanese community 
and members of the Japanese consular staff in the Philippines, 
ties which continued unimpeded by the worsening relations be-
tween the United States and Japan.246 Unfortunately, however, 
the ultimate tragic denouement was foretold in a dispatch from 
Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo to the Japanese Consulate in 
Manila dated Dec. 2, 1941: 
For our convenience we shall have Kihara remain in Tokyo for the 
time being, so please inform Quezon through Vargas that Kihara caught 
a cold as soon as he arrived in Tokyo and is resting and will not be able 
to return to his post as scheduled.247 
Conclusion 
By the outbreak of World War II, the key role of the Jap-
anese in the economic and even the political life of Davao 
Province was clear. The extent of Japanese landholdings need 
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not be repeated here, nor is it necessary to reiterate the Japanese 
domination of trade, commerce, and industry in Davao. It was 
unquestionably Japanese capital and Japanese labor that had 
made Davao one of the richest provinces in the Philippines, and 
these developments had undoubtedly provided a signal con-
tribution to the economic growth of the new nation. What is 
probably less desirable in the overall evaluation of the Japanese 
settlement in Davao was the practical creation of a kind of state 
within a state and the cooperation of a significant number of 
educated, articulate, and influential Filipinos in that phenome-
non. 
"Davaokuo" was surely an exaggeration, but there is suffi-
cient truth in the symbolism of the term to cause one to wonder 
why the communal exclusiveness of the Japanese in Davao had 
persistently prevented the emergence of any semblance of inte-
gration into the Filipino nation. On the eve of Pearl Harbor 
one of the most perceptive observers of Philippine life, Teodoro 
Locsin, thought he had the answer: 
In the United States, the first generation of Japanese immigrants have 
clung to their old customs and traditions, and doubtless continue to look 
upon Japan as a home. The second generation, torn between loyalty, 
not to Japan, but to their parents, and loyalty to the country of their 
birth, may however be counted upon to align themselves, in a crisis, with 
America. Japan holds nothing for them, America holds everything. The 
third generation Japanese, with no experience of divided loyalties, are 
Americans through and through. Their children will be even more so. 
To the Japanese immigrant in America, his new country offers free-
dom of opportunity, freedom of intellect, freedom of choice and freedom 
of growth. America makes him free. A man's home is his castle, not the 
Emperor's preserve. The woman strikes off the ancient chain that binds 
her to the man in feudal subservience. She becomes the equal of man. 
For the first time, she is a person. 
Filipinos are, today, second-generation Americans. They are still 
torn between respect for the old and admiration for the new. They have 
nothing settled and definite to offer the Japanese in this country as an 
irresistible exchange for old and tried Japanese ways. In many ways we 
are as "conservative" as the Japanese. One does not trade one set of pro-
hibitions for simply another set.248 
However, the isolation of alien communities in foreign en-
vironments was by no means an uniquely Philippine experience. 
Nor was the economic dominance attained by the Japanese in 
102 
Davao unknown in other societies, e.g., the Chinese in Malaya 
or the Indians in East Africa. What seemed particularly unfor-
tunate in the Philippines was the extensive cooperation in ad-
vancing their interests which the Japanese obtained from a 
number of high ranking and influential Filipinos. And in this 
context by cooperation literal and substantial assistance to the 
Japanese in securing their economic control of Davao is meant, 
and the roles of men like Laurel and Sabido in this regard have 
already been detailed.249 In essence, however, this meant politi-
cal control as well, since many of the provincial officials of Davao 
were to varying degrees financially involved with and therefore 
subservient to the Japanese; and several national figures, es-
pecially the provincial representatives at Manila, were similarly 
indebted to the Japanese. 
It seems fruitless to make long lists of those implicated in 
such arrangements, but many of them had actually migrated 
from Luzon or the Visayas to seek their fortunes with the Jap-
anese in Davao. Let one prominent example, former Davao Gov-
ernor Juan Sarenas, originally from Nueva Ecija, suffice. Sarenas 
had moved to Davao where he drove about the province in a 
large Studebaker automobile, reportedly a gift from Ogawa Yosa-
buro of the Southern Cross Plantation Company. It was also 
Attorney Sarenas who chastised his countrymen for calling 
Davao "Davaokuo" and who publicly acclaimed the contribu-
tions of the Japanese: 
That this people control the hemp industry in Davao is but natural 
because more than anybody they are engaged in the hemp industry. In 
like manner we control cockpits and other holiday places of diversion, 
because more than anybody else we indulge in them. So—should we 
blame these people for controlling the hemp industry.250 
Sarenas, as noted earlier, was also on the payroll of the Furu-
kawa Plantation Company as their consulting lawyer and served 
several other Davao Japanese firms in the same capacity. His 
special role for the Southern Cross Plantation Company was typi-
cal of that filled by his countrymen for many other Japanese 
enterprises. The following letter251 speaks for itself: 
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SOUTHERN CROSS PLANTATION CO., INC. 
Planters & Hemp Exporters, Davao, Davao, P.I. 
August 11, 1941 
The Honorable Commissioner 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Manila 
Sir: 
Replying to your communication of July 10, 1941, I have the honor 
to submit the following for the purpose of record: 
PRESENT STOCKHOLDERS: 
J. A. SARENAS 560 shares 
C. MURAKAMI 190 shares 
Y. OGAWA 190 shares 
E. M. SARENAS252 50 shares 
HIDEKO OGAWA 10 shares 
1000 shares 
PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: 
J. A. SARENAS President 
Y. OGAWA Vice President-Treasurer 
C. B. SARENAS2^ Secretary 
E. M. SARENAS Director 
HIDEKO OGAWA Director 
C. MURAKAMI Director 
(NOTE: C. Murakami died some time in 1938 and his properties are 
under administration, the administrator appointed by the Court being 
Y. Ogawa.) 
Respectfully yours, 
(Sgd.) J. A. SARENAS 
President 
In the general election of 1941, Davao Assemblyman Cesar 
Sotto (originally from Cebu) ran for reelection. Having affili-
ated himself with the Nacionalista Party after his election in 
1938, he expected to be the official candidate. However, his 
bitter dispute with former Assemblyman Romualdo Quimpo 
caused Sotto to be abandoned by the Nacionalistas when, for the 
1941 campaign, Davao was declared a ''free zone." And his op-
ponent who had the full support of Quimpo and the implicit 
support of Quezon was none other than Juan A. Sarenas, who 
had finished third in the 1938 election. Both Sotto, supported 
by the mayor of Davao, and Sarenas, supported by the Davao 
provincial governor, sought Japanese campaign assistance. T o 
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this end Davao Consul Kihara requested from the Foreign Of-
fice 5,000 pesos to be used to "support and guide" both candi-
dates and also to provide a fund to deal "in an appropriate man-
ner" with the successful candidate.254 
During the campaign itself the influence and prestige of 
Quimpo in behalf of Sarenas began to tell, and Sotto in despera-
tion resorted to attacks on Sarenas for his "secret ties" with Jap-
anese companies.255 At one point Sotto had prepared cartoons 
unfavorable to Japan for distribution as campaign literature to 
be used against Sarenas. However, Consul Kihara feared that 
such propaganda might rekindle the whole land question which 
had just been so satisfactorily settled in Manila. Therefore, he 
requested Sotto not to use such materials for the reason indi-
cated, and Sotto complied256—a rather amazing example of the 
extent of the influence which the Japanese were able to wield in 
Davao politics. 
That the Japanese used tactics such as these is perhaps re-
grettable though surely understandable. What seems more re-
grettable is that such machinations should have proved as suc-
cessful as they did. The hard core of the Japanese population at 
Davao probably never exceeded a maximum of about 18,000, so 
that numerically, despite their alienation from the mainstream 
of Philippine life, they posed no particular threat to the Islands. 
Japanese landholding in Davao, though again small in terms of 
acreage, was indeed highly productive and an undeniable 
economic asset. However, neither cultural isolation nor 
economic wealth need have resulted in provincial political 
control which in turn affected national politics at the highest 
levels. For this latter development the Filipinos had only them-
selves to blame. 
In sum, the Davao problem as it affected Japanese-Philippine 
relations serves to epitomize three distinct aspects of those re-
lations. First, despite almost continuous criticism in the Islands 
and especially in the United States, the success of the Japanese 
in maintaining and indeed improving their position at Davao 
unimpeded is certainly strong evidence of the excellence of 
Japanese diplomacy in general and of the astuteness of Japanese 
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representatives in the Philippines in particular. The latter fac-
tor is demonstrated not only by the high level of mutual confi-
dence that was attained between President Quezon and the Jap-
anese consular corps but by the actual complicity with the aims 
of Japanese policy by important personalities like Laurel and 
Sabido. Secondly, the handling of the Davao question provides 
ample support for the thesis that the American government was 
determined to take no action in the Philippines which might be 
misconstrued by the Japanese as unfriendly and certainly did 
nothing, especially during the Commonwealth period, which 
might have encouraged the Filipino leadership to take a firmer 
stand toward the Japanese. Thirdly, the successful resolution 
of this difficult problem between Japanese and Filipino officials, 
in an era of constantly worsening American-Japanese relations, 
is a tribute to the remarkable statesmanship of President Quezon, 
whose principal concern throughout continued to be to try to 
insure for the soon-to-be-independent Philippines as safe a 
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